Korea in Asia by Barfield, Claude
KOREA IN ASIA:
KOREA’S DEVELOPMENT, ASIAN REGIONALISM,
AND U.S.-KOREA ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Claude Barfield
STUDIES SERIES: I
SPECIAL
K
O
R
E
A
IN
A
S
IA
C
laude B
arfield
KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE
1201 F Street, NW, Suite 910
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone (202) 464-1982 • Facsimile (202) 464-1987 • www.keia.org
This informative and insightful book examines trade and other economic issues
relevant to the U.S.-Korea relationship from the perspective of an expert with
years of experience in international and regional trade policy. — Kim Kihwan,
Chairman of the Seoul Financial Forum
This book shows first how Korea was transformed from a poverty-stricken
backwater in 1950 to one of the world’s leading economies today. Its trade
problems with the US are one result, and nobody is more familiar with that ter-
ritory than Claude Barfield. He closes with a sobering treatment of “economic
regionalism—Asia’s newest fad—and shows why that’s a wrong road to follow.
— Bernard K. Gordon, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of
New Hampshire
KOREA IN ASIA:
KOREA’S DEVELOPMENT, ASIAN REGIONALISM,
AND U.S.-KOREA ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Claude Barfield
Korea Economic Institute    1201 F Street, NW,  Suite 910    Washington, DC 20004
Telephone (202) 464-1982    Facsimile (202) 464-1987    Web Address www.keia.org
KEI Editorial Board
Editor: James M. Lister
Contract Editor: Mary Marik
Assistant Editor: Florence M. Lowe-Lee
The Korea Economic Institute is registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as
an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation
established by the Government of the Republic of Korea. This material is filed with the
Department of Justice, where the required registration statement is available for public
inspection. Registration does not indicate U.S. Government approval of the contents of
this document.
KEI is not engaged in the practice of law, does not render legal services, and is not a
lobbying organization.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. While this publication
is part of the overall program of the Korea Economic Institute, as endorsed by its Board
of Directors and Advisory Council, its contents do not necessarily reflect the views of
individual members of the Board or the Advisory Council.
Copyright © 2003 by the Korea Economic Institute of America.
Printed in the United States of America.
All Rights Reserved
Preface
The Korea Economic Institute (KEI) is pleased to launch, with this volume, a
new publication series of “Special Studies.” In contrast to KEI’s other publica-
tions, which generally take the form of a compilation of relatively short articles
on analytical and policy issues by a number of authors, this series will afford
individual authors an opportunity to explore in depth a particular topic of current
interest relating to Korea.
Dr. Claude Barfield’s examination of Korea’s economic role in Asia draws
together a number of strands of policy issues, particularly trade and investment,
that help explain the Republic of Korea’s impressive rise to the top echelon of
economies in the region and indeed in the world. As importantly, the book looks
at some of the different challenges that Korea is facing or will face in the trade
policy area as it narrows the technology gap with other leading economies.
KEI is dedicated to objective, informative analysis. We welcome comments
on this and our other publications. We seek to expand contacts with academic
and research organizations across the country and would be pleased to entertain
proposals for other “Special Studies.”
Joseph A. B. Winder
President
Korea Economic Institute
August 2003

Foreword
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction, and it covers
the historical background of Korea’s economic growth, its export growth, and
U.S.-Korea economic relations since 1950.
Chapter 2 first traces the evolution of Korea’s development strategies and
phases beginning in the 1960s; it then describes the role of foreign investment
and technology in the growth of Korea’s economy. Chapter 2 concludes with a
description and analysis of Korea’s new development model, with its emphasis
on science, the role of innovation, and the growth of service sectors.
Chapter 3 chronicles and analyzes Korea’s trade and investment patterns
since 1960, including assessments of Korea’s growing position and competitive-
ness in world markets. Separate sections address the special place of the United
States in Korea’s trade relations and also Korea’s recent increasing involvement
with Asian trade and investment.
Chapter 4 deals with the impact of growing Asian regionalism over the past
decade and with the substantial increase in proposals and negotiations for bilat-
eral, subregional, and regional trading arrangements among both Asian nations
and nations outside Asia. This chapter also analyzes the results of various simu-
lation models of the welfare and trade impacts of proposed trade agreements; it
uses proposed Korea-Japan and Korea-U.S. free trade agreements as key ex-
amples. It then explores the welfare effects on Korea and the United States of a
number of other proposed bilateral and regional trade arrangements.
Chapter 5 presents conclusions and recommendations for future U.S. and
Korea trade relations on three levels: how to reconcile common and competing
goals in the World Trade Organization Doha Round; potential responses and
priorities of Asian and non-Asian countries regarding future bilateral, subre-
gional, and regional trade agreements; and, after describing in some detail current
bilateral disputes, Chapter 5 suggests a new framework for dealing with these
issues.
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Introduction and Historical Background
The goal of this study is to explore the current state of U.S.-Korea trade and
economic relations, with special emphasis on the impact of the rise of Asian
regionalism and the implications of an evolving Korean development model. This
book explores possibilities for closer U.S.-Korea economic relations, the resolu-
tion of current trade disputes, and the development of common approaches (or at
least an understanding of the differences in approach) to both multilateral trade
negotiations and Asian regional initiatives.
Korea’s Economic Growth
During recent decades, the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea) has transformed
itself from a poor, agrarian nation into one of the fastest-growing industrialized
economies in the world. Until the launch of an initial economic development plan
in the early 1960s, the country was heavily dependent on imported raw materials
and manufactured goods. The economic development plan of 1962 was, indeed,
a drastic turnaround for a heretofore low-income country.
Korea’s phenomenal growth has been achieved as a result of the successful
implementation of forward-looking economic strategies formulated in the 1960s
and later. Korea adopted policies that emphasized, first, the enhancement of the
country’s export position and, later, the gradual adoption of market liberalization
programs. These two complementary strategies have worked to propel Korea
into a new era of industrial leadership and prosperity.
The results have been impressive. Over the relevant three decades (from the
early 1970s to 2002) Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew from the equiva-
lent of $8 billion in 1970 to $444 billion in 2002, with per capita GDP soaring
from $254 to about $9,318 at current price levels (see Table 1). Wide-reaching
changes include extensive expansion of the manufacturing sector, from around
577 billion won (approximately $1.82 billion) in 1970 to over 163 trillion won
(approximately $123 billion) in 2001, and an increase in commodity trade vol-
ume, from $835 million in 1970 to more than $161 billion by 2002.
2 Korea in Asia
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The dramatic transformation of the Korean economy would be seen as im-
pressive by any standard, but it is particularly striking against the backdrop of the
country’s history. Korea has experienced colonial rule and upheaval throughout
much of the twentieth century. Few industries existed before and during the era of
Japan’s imperial control (1910–45). The Korean War (1950–53) also took its
toll, leaving extreme devastation and a rapidly expanding, largely unemployed
population. In 1960, the country was heavily dependent on imported raw materi-
als and manufactured goods. The economic turnaround after 1961 was, indeed, a
drastic development for a theretofore undeveloped nation.
Since 1970, Korea’s GDP has recorded strong year-on-year growth, particu-
larly after 1986 (see Figure 1). The 1997 Asian financial crisis caused the first
big contraction during the observed period and brought a brief pause to rapid
economic growth. GDP contracted 6.7 percent in 1998 after rising 5.0 percent in
1997 and 6.8 percent in 1996. Thanks to the sharp recovery of the current ac-
count surplus, the Korean economy quickly rebounded and continued to recover
during the 1999–2002 period, although by 2002 nominal GDP in U.S. dollar
terms had still not returned to the 1996 level because of the substantial deprecia-
tion of the won in response to the crisis.
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Figure 1: Korea s Annual GDP, 1970 2001, billions of U.S. dollars, 
current prices
Source: BOK various.
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Korea’s Export Growth
During recent decades, Korea’s strong performance in exports has been the prin-
cipal factor behind its successful growth and industrialization. The ratio of ex-
ports to GDP was only 10 percent in 1970, but it rose rapidly to 28 percent by
 ’s nnual , –2 01, bi lions of U.S. do lars,
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1980 and to 36 percent in 2002. As a result, Korea has become a major exporting
nation, ranking 11th among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) member countries in the volume of exports as well as imports in
2001 (KOSIS various). Rapid expansion of exports accompanied the rapid growth
of real GDP and has, in turn, brought fundamental changes in all sectors of the
economy. The rapid expansion of exports was achieved mainly by the increase in
production of manufactured goods since the early 1960s (see Table 1). As a re-
sult, the manufacturing sector’s share increased from 577.2 billion won (equiva-
lent to $1.82 billion) in 1970 to 163.3 trillion won (equivalent to $123.2 billion)
in 2001, whereas the primary sector—for example, agriculture, forestry, fishing,
mining, and quarrying—increased only from 779.8 billion won (equivalent to
$2.46 billion) to 25.9 trillion won (equivalent to $19.4 billion) throughout the
same period.
However, Korea’s growth pattern resulted not only from Korea’s outward,
industry-, and growth-oriented development strategy, but also from the choices
of various economic policies (Chenery and Syrquin 1975). Certainly Korea’s
high growth was ignited by the expansion of exports and sustained by the rapid
growth of export industries. Many Korean industries were developed on the basis
of the export-first principle.
Because of the outsized expansion of industrial capacity, the amount of do-
mestic investment always exceeded the amount of domestic savings. The gap
between investment and savings was filled with foreign borrowing, which was
required despite the high domestic savings rate. This is one of the major rea-
sons—along with the need to import oil and many other industrial raw materi-
als—why Korea’s foreign debt continued to rise until 1985.
Also, the debt-equity ratio of large Korean firms, which were forced to over-
expand their production capacity, tended to be higher than debt-equity ratios in
any of the other Asian Tigers.1 As a result, low domestic savings, a high debt-
equity ratio for most firms, and a large foreign debt characterized Korean growth.
The expansion of industrial capacity in Korea was achieved largely through
the expansion of existing firms instead of through the creation of new firms. This
pattern has persisted and has resulted in the expansion of a small number of very
large firms and business groups (chaebol), causing a large gap between large and
small firms. This in turn has led to a concentration of economic power, in particu-
lar during Korea’s heavy industry and development phase in the 1970s.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed a number of weaknesses in the Ko-
rean development model, and succeeding Korean presidential administrations
have struggled with varying success to reform financial and competition laws
and regulations. In 2003, Korea faces major challenges regarding its economic
future in Asia, its competitive place in the world, and its traditional close eco-
nomic and political alliance with the United States.
1. Asian Tigers comprise Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.
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U.S-Korea Economic Relations since 1950
The United States and Korea have maintained strong economic and trade rela-
tions since the founding of the Republic in 1948. U.S. development assistance
during the 1950s and 1960s provided a good deal of the financial resources needed
to reconstruct the postwar Korean economy. Since the 1970s, trade has been a
key component of Korea’s development model, and the United States has consis-
tently ranked as Korea’s most important trading partner.
In 2002, bilateral trade flows between the two nations were more than $58
billion, with the United States occupying first place as Korea’s top export market
(representing more than 20 percent of total Korean exports) and second place as
a source of imports. In turn, Korea was the eighth-largest export market for the
United States and its sixth-largest source of imports.
Although still large, Korea dependence on the U.S. market has fallen dra-
matically since the 1970s, when the U.S. share of Korean imports was well over
50 percent. During the 1990s, the United States vied with Japan as Korea’s single
most important source for imports; but the Japanese share has fallen from a high
of 40 percent in the early 1980s to about 20 percent in 2002. The United States is
a far more important trade partner for Korea than Korea is for the United States;
in recent years, U.S. trade with Korea has accounted for only 2 percent to 4
percent of total U.S. trade. Particularly since the Asian financial crisis in the late
1990s, the United States has run a significant trade deficit with Korea, increasing
to almost   $9 billion in 2002.
The United States has been a leading supplier of foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Korea, although Korea accounts for less than 1 percent of total U.S.
outward investment—a reflection of the relatively minor role FDI has played in
the Korean economy. Because of changed Korean government policies and the
Asian financial crisis that depressed the value of Korean assets, investment in
Korea grew strongly after 1997; between 1997 and 2000, the amount of total
U.S. FDI in Korea exceeded aggregate U.S. investment for all prior years com-
bined. In return, the United States has received a fairly large share of  Korean
outward investment, more than one-fourth of Korea’s total.
For much of the period, the United States and Korea pursued their bilateral
economic policy by using only the multilateral trading system of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Since 1990, however, the situation for
both nations has changed markedly: first, the United States negotiated a bilateral
trade agreement with Canada and then moved directly to form the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico. It then went on to
pursue the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) with Latin America and, late
in the Clinton administration, other bilateral negotiations (Jordan, Chile, and
Singapore). Under President George W. Bush, U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick has announced a policy of “competitive liberalization” under which the
United States—while still giving first priority to multilateral negotiations—will
entertain offers of free trade agreements (FTAs) both regionally and bilaterally.
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Korea came much later to a policy of pursuing trade agreements outside of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). It did join the special “concerted
unilateralism” of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but only in
1999 did the Korean government begin actively to plan and execute a series of
bilateral and subregional FTAs, both in Asia and with other regions and countries
(Chile, for example). The shift of Korea—and, most notably, Japan—to a policy
of actively seeking out new partners for FTAs in Asia has major implications for
the future of U.S-Korea trade and investment relations. It is one of the main goals
of this study to explore those implications.
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The Korean Development Model:
Past and Present
From early on, economists like William Cline (1982) chose the economic devel-
opment process in Korea as the ideal model for East Asia. Besides Japan, Korea
is widely regarded as one of the most successful of the developing Asian coun-
tries (Christensen and Cummings 1981); and Korea, like many other high-per-
forming Asian countries, followed the Japanese model of extensive government
intervention and its own version of cooperative research and development (R&D)
projects.
Countries like Singapore and Hong Kong share many of Korea’s character-
istics, such as its lack of natural resources, but they all went on to post remarkable
economic growth. Even more important than the shortage of resources in these
countries was their compulsive drive for exports based upon a strong and grow-
ing manufacturing sector. Even though manufacturing represented only about
one-quarter of total GDP throughout the period, much of this production was for
export. In this Korea was perhaps the most outstanding example. Korea’s export-
led growth, as it is often called, was based not just on its own strong fundamen-
tals, however, but also on a benevolent trading system in which other nations,
particularly the United States, were willing to absorb Korean exports. The eco-
nomic development successes of Korea and the other East Asian Tigers have
been viewed by many neoclassical economists as examples of successful develop-
ment led primarily by freely functioning markets.
Korea’s Development Model: One Example of the Asian Miracle?
Korea has undergone five somewhat distinct phases during the period of 1961 to
the present (see Figure 2). These phases were matched by a series of five-year
economic development plans. The 1961–72 period was one in which major policy
reforms and institution building promoted export-oriented industrialization. In
the second phase, which began in 1973 and continued through 1979, a heavy-
and chemical-industry drive was implemented through subsidized credit, special
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tax policies, selective protection, entry restrictions, and direct government in-
volvement in industrial policymaking. In the third period, from 1980 to 1996, the
government pursued the same export-led strategy while it emphasized domestic
price stability and market liberalization. The fourth phase is the period of the
Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998. A fifth phase, a time of recovery and
strengthened growth, including new development models, began in 1999.
Figure 2: Stages of Industrial Policy in Korea since 1961
1961 1972         Initiation of export-led growth                       
(light industries)
1973 1979         Promotion of heavy industry and the        
chemical industry
1980 1996         Stabilization, liberalization, and                
renewed growth
1997 1998         Asian financial crisis
1999 current      New development models
Initiation of Export-Led Growth, 1961–72
The first five-year plan, starting in 1962, aimed at promoting import-substituting
industries. To promote the targeted industries, the government provided many
policy tools, including import restrictions, tax incentives, custom rebates, and
selected promotion of inward FDI (Taniura 1989). To repay foreign loans, the
government soon shifted the target to export-oriented industries (Cho 1998). The
promotional policies for targeted industries were accompanied by policies—in-
cluding entry restrictions for targeted industries, allocation of export rights to
specific markets, and allocation of product lines among incumbents in a specific
industry—that directly shaped industrial structure (Kodama 1995). Specific in-
dustries were targeted, but, because the government targeted export growth, the
government plan often worked “with the market.” Rhee et al. (1984, 36) state:
The Korean policymaking style is not so much a deliberate one of
careful planning and debate, but more one of diving in, getting started,
observing results, adjusting policy and repeating the process until the
appropriate mix is found. This willingness to implement new policies
without careful deliberate planning was generally a virtue for export
policymaking—primarily because the test of those policies was suc-
cess on the international marketplace.
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Promotion of Heavy Industry and the Chemical Industry, 1973–79
The first phase of industrial policy in Korea was followed by the heavy- and
chemical-industry (HCI) drive in the 1970s, when economic activity was increas-
ingly concentrated in the chaebol because it was easier for the government to
implement its policies through a smaller number of firms. Korea launched an
HCI drive in 1973 by the identification of and support for six strategic industries:
steel, petrochemicals, (nonferrous) metals, shipbuilding, electronics, and machin-
ery.2 Steel, petrochemicals, and metals were selected “with a view to enhancing
self-sufficiency in industrial raw materials” and the others because “they are go-
ing to be developed into technology-intensive industries” (Kim 1993, 18). Ko-
rean policymakers envisioned and planned the quick transition from labor-inten-
sive industry to this narrow range of heavy and capital-intensive industries even
before the official presidential declaration on HCI policy on 12 January 1973.
Promotive measures and foundations for these HCI industries were laid down
first during the second five-year plan (Brennan 2001).3
During the HCI push of the 1970s, it is estimated that the government was
directly or indirectly in command of almost two-thirds of the investment resources
of the economy (Park 1988, 339). Defenders of the HCI program point out that in
early stages of economic development serious imperfections exist in private mar-
kets, particularly imperfect information. In this situation, governments may well
have better information about the potential profitability of certain industries and
may be less risk averse than the private sector. In addition, there may be exter-
nalities beyond private profits that benefit the entire economy.
Of great importance, also, during the 1960s and 1970s was the decision by
Korean government administrators to allow checks and balances from the inter-
national marketplace to act as filters for the system. Thus, while some cronyism
did exist, preferential credit was not handed out indiscriminately. A stringent test
of export competitiveness was applied, and those who failed this test were jetti-
soned from the favored programs (Sohn, Yang, and Kim 2002).
Stabilization, Liberalization, and Renewed Growth, 1980–96
In the 1980s, a limited set of policy measures—including limited trade liberaliza-
tion, passage of a competition law, deregulation, and some privatization—aimed
at strengthening market mechanisms. Nevertheless, the role of the state and the
2. Yang Jun-sok, one commentator for this study, pointed out in an e-mail on 10 March 2003
that, in part as a result of fears that the Nixon administration was considering a reduction of
ground forces in Korea, the shift to heavy industry was a political move to foster defense
industries.
3. The second five-year plan (1967–71) designated synthetic fibers, petrochemicals, and elec-
tronic equipment as major sectors for protection against imports and for promotion by fiscal
and financial measures. Promotion laws were issued during this period for industrial machin-
ery (1967), shipbuilding (1967), electronics (1969), steel (1970), and petrochemicals (1970).
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reliance on the chaebol remained strong. Still, during the first half of the 1980s,
Korea succeeded in curbing inflationary pressures as the stabilization program
was firmly maintained; the cost to the economy was a low-growth performance.
The major changes in trade policy included intensive promotion of export
goods and market diversification, reform of the export support systems, lowering
of tariff rates to expand the import of goods to be used in manufacturing, and
expansion of loans associated with the export of durable goods such as machin-
ery and ships. Foreign-debt management was also given high policy priority. The
essence of the debt-management policy was to reduce the debt-service ratio from
13.2 percent to 11.1 percent during the fifth five-year plan (Song 1997).
As of 1986 the Korean economy had begun to realize high economic growth,
stable prices, and a trade surplus. The broad policy direction of the sixth five-
year plan was to enhance the efficiency and strengthen the international competi-
tiveness of the Korean economy in general by reforming the free enterprise mar-
ket system. The seventh five-year plan was formulated in 1991 after Korea be-
came a member of the United Nations (UN), after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and when Korea’s per capita GDP reached $7,000 (see Table 1). On pa-
per, it emphasized the role of the private sector in the preparation and implemen-
tation of the plan. This plan was suspended and   replaced before the end of its
second year by the New Economy five-year plan (1993–97) prepared by the Kim
Young-sam government. The stated purpose of the 1993 plan was to elevate Ko-
rea to the level of advanced industrial countries by 1997.
The Asian Financial Crisis, 1997–98
The onset of the financial crisis toward the end of 1997 turned Korea’s economy
around, and the downside of the old development paradigm surfaced with a ven-
geance. The 1970s paradigm had tightened the bonds among the government,
industrial corporations, and the financial sector. These bonds over time had two
negative consequences.
• Businesses favored by the government captured the lion’s share of govern-
ment credits and aid, while many new start-ups in potentially profitable areas
were starved. During the 1970s, also, the implicit too-big-to-fail syndrome
began to exert a large impact on both the government and the chaebol, with
the usual attendant problems of moral hazard—chaebol increasingly figured
that, no matter what their actions, public resources would always bail them
out.
• The financial sector weakened, and banks and other lending institutions felt a
growing pressure to allocate loans on the basis of the government’s priorities
rather than on the basis of normal credit risk criteria. The partial liberalization
of financial markets also allowed many Korean banks to create foreign branches
that operated outside of the prudential supervision of Korean banking authori-
ties. The Korean government also turned a blind eye to the creation by the
chaebol of nonbank financial institutions within their corporate structures.
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Increasingly, this resulted in the chaebol’s forcing profitable subsidiaries to
guarantee loans to less-profitable subsidiaries, which hid overall corporate
weakness (Graham 2003).
When the crunch came in 1997, the most important symbol of the weak-
nesses of the Korean corporate structure and financial institutions was the enor-
mous and quickly increasing debt ratios of the leading chaebol (Table 2).4 Sohn,
Yang, and Kim (2002, 20) state:
Although it cannot be denied that Korea’s development strategy
contributed greatly to its economic “miracle,” such legacies of the
strategy as “implicit guarantee” for chaebol by the government, the
growth of chaebol to such a size that they were “too big to fail,” as
well as the weak financial sector with little capacity for credit evalua-
tion, were based, in part, on such development strategy.5 These result
in moral hazard problems on the part of the Korean financial and cor-
porate sectors.
In response to the financial crisis, Korea liberalized its regulation of finan-
cial services, FDI, capital flows, and trade. In the financial sector, agreements
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reinforced the independence of the
Bank of Korea (BOK), and Korea’s National Assembly passed legislation that
allowed banking, insurance, securities, and other nonbank  financial institutions
to enter each other’s lines of business. In addition, in April 1998 the Financial
Supervisory Commission (FSC) was established in Korea to supervise the com-
bined financial services sectors. One of its first tasks was to preside over major
financial restructuring, including decisions about which banks were not salvage-
able and how to construct an exit strategy for those institutions that would have to
be closed. In addition, the FSC supervised the decisions and timetable for com-
pliance with the international Basel capital adequacy standards. By the end of
2001, the FSC (in conjunction with the Korea Asset Management Corporation,
4. An excellent new appraisal (Noland and Pack 2003) of the impact of targeted industrial
policy in the postwar development of three key East Asian economies—Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan—concludes that targeting accelerated the growth of the three economies by about 0.3
percent annually. Therefore, because these economies were growing at about 10 percent annu-
ally, the targeting policies were not the predominant explanation for their success. In addition,
although all three economies had experienced a devastating loss of physical capital during
World War II, each also started with high ratios of human capital to per capita incomes. Also,
each had experienced at least some industrialization and had some capital market sophistica-
tion before the war. And, in each country, state intervention encouraged rent seeking, some
corruption, and, more important, the subordination of the financial system to political ends.
5. In their note 6, Sohn, Yang, and Kim (2002, 20) state, “It is interesting to note that in the
1980s, some American observers argued that such Asian-style government-led development
strategy was exactly what America needed to develop critical “high-tech” industries.”
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which had been created to purchase nonperforming loans from banks and other
financial institutions) had reduced the number of commercial banks to 11, the
number of merchant banks to 9, and the number of investment trusts to 8 (Gra-
ham 2003).
Table 2: Debt Ratios and the Number of Affiliated Companies for 30 Major
Chaebol, 1995–98
                                             1995   1996         1997             1998
Debt ratio 355.7 347.4 386.5 518.9
Number of affiliated companies 623 669 819 804
Source: Sohn, Yang, and Kim 2002, 24.
FDI in Korea was substantially liberalized through the enactment of the For-
eign Investment Promotion Act of 1998 and subsequent administrative actions,
and after 1997 FDI in the Korean economy rose dramatically compared with
prior years. As of September 2001, more than 1,000 business areas were com-
pletely open to foreign investment, 8 business sectors partly opened, and only
radio and television broadcasting entirely closed. As of the end of 2002, esti-
mates indicate that almost 99 percent of all business sectors were open to foreign
investment. In addition, all types of investment are now permitted, including es-
tablishment of new businesses, acquisition of existing shares, and long-term loan
investment. Further, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been
liberalized, and requirements for government approval have been abolished. Land
acquisition by foreigners has also been opened up, with very few exceptions re-
lated to cultural and historical landmarks.
A second channel for FDI is privatization. More than 30 of 108 public enter-
prises—constituting 70 percent of employees and sales revenues of previously
public enterprises—have been sold off, fully or partly. Among the most impor-
tant public enterprises partly or totally privatized were companies in printing and
publishing, steel, oil pipelines, chemicals, tobacco, telecommunications, electric
power, and natural gas (Sohn, Yang, and Kim 2002).
In the area of capital account liberalization, the 1998 Foreign Exchange Trans-
action Act permitted international wire transactions on profits received from eq-
uity trading and on principal and interest on long-term loans and foreigners’ re-
mittances. Second, the domestic bond market was fully opened, removing all
restrictions on foreign purchase of debt securities and ceilings on foreign pur-
chase of public debt instruments. For foreign exchange transactions, all controls
on foreign exchange by businesses were abolished in 1999, and in 2000 such
restrictions were removed on foreign exchange transactions by individuals (Gra-
ham 2003).
A series of measures liberalized trade; some were instituted as a result of an
agreement with the IMF, and some resulted from independent action by the Ko-
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rean government (a good deal of liberalization had already occurred during the
1980s and 1990s). The Import Diversification Program (IDP) was eliminated,
the number of adjustment tariffs was reduced, and some services sectors were
liberalized further. Originally introduced in the late 1970s, the IDP had aimed to
diversify the sources of imports and alleviate chronic trade deficits with certain
trade partners (particularly Japan, and particularly in automobiles and electronic
products). The number of items included grew to more than 600 in the 1980s, but
during the 1990s the Korean government reduced IDP items at the request of the
IMF. In June 1999, the program was completely eliminated.
A second IMF-mandated measure was a reduction in the use of so-called
adjustment tariffs. Adjustment tariffs were temporary tariffs placed on certain
goods defined as sensitive, allegedly to head off import surges. Although these
temporary tariffs remained below the “bound” rates Korea had accepted in the
WTO and thus were technically legal, Korea’s trade partners had long complained
that they constituted significant trade barriers because of their volatility and ran-
domness. As a part of the IMF agreement, the number of goods subject to such
temporary tariffs was substantially reduced.
In April 1998, the Korean government agreed to liberalize certain key ser-
vices sectors, including securities dealing, insurance, and property leasing. At the
same time, additional financial services deregulation was adopted as a part of
agreements with the OECD (Sohn, Yang, and Kim 2002).
New Development Models: Keys to Competitiveness and Growth
Korea’s development paradigm is now at a crossroads. Most of the impressive
economic growth in the past was underpinned by strong capital accumulation and
growth in labor inputs, to which the role of government as the nationwide re-
source mobilizer and manager was critical. But the development model predi-
cated on the rapid expansion of manufacturing and the role of the chaebol fal-
tered badly by the end of the 1990s. A recent World Bank and OECD report
(Dahlman and Andersson 2000, 31) noted that Korea is “caught between the
rapid advance of the export-oriented developing countries in the region, and es-
pecially China, on the one hand, and the G7 (developed countries) on the other
and is currently under strong pressure to shift its development strategy.”
The World Bank and OECD report suggests two alternate models that, in
combination, would allow Korea to build on its earlier successful growth and
development path. The first model entails a concerted public–private partnership
and effort to continue to climb the technological competitiveness ladder through
a more comprehensive, market-based set of science and technology (S&T) poli-
cies, including increased emphasis on the production of a technologically sophis-
ticated labor force and a drive to produce first-rate research universities. In addi-
tion, a complementary medium-term strategy would be to take advantage of
Korea’s strategic location at the center of a potential hotbed of regional growth
and through public–private partnerships lay the foundation for becoming a busi-
ness hub in Northeast Asia. Such a strategy will demand major changes in the
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mind-set of both the government and the citizens—a turnabout in attitudes to-
ward FDI and a commitment to build a services economy that complements the
successes of Korea’s manufacturing sector (Kim H. 2003).
Role and Direction of S&T Policy during Industrialization
In its growth strategy for S&T, Korea will be partly building on earlier public
policy initiatives. Several studies (for example, Dahlman et al. 1987) suggest that
the success story of Korea’s industrialization stemmed from S&T policies and
strategies that attempted—with mixed results—to create an S&T infrastructure
to underpin overall industrial policy. These S&T strategies aimed first to assimi-
late foreign technologies by developing the necessary technological capability to
use and adapt imported technologies efficiently, especially in targeted industries.
But in more recent years the Korean government has also demonstrated an aware-
ness of the necessity for native-grown technologies that are based on a broader
and deeper scientific base.
Early Foreign Technology Import Policy
Initial government polices aimed at importing foreign technologies—particularly
the machinery necessary for early industrial development. Successive Korean
administrations believed that the technological capability needed for labor-inten-
sive export industries in the 1960s and for heavy industry and chemicals in the
1970s could be acquired easily from foreign sources. Beginning in the 1960s,
Korea made concerted efforts to facilitate the international transfer of packaged
technology. Technology transfer was obtained through imports of capital goods,
FDI, and technology licensing. To promote technical collaboration, Korea fol-
lowed the path of Japan in the import of technology: between 1962 and 1985, it
imported $1.3 billion worth of technology (Kang 1989, 54). Figure 3 shows that
technology imported to Korea generally increased over the 1982–2000 period
and reached $3.1 billion in 2000. There is a particularly large jump from $694
million in 1994 to almost $1 billion in 1995. Since 1982, most (around 60 per-
cent) technology imports have come from the United States; Japan has supplied
about 17 percent.
To gain leading-edge technology to support selected industries, the Korean
government spent a huge amount of foreign exchange each year to pay royalties
for licensing fees (see Figure 4). The government felt that licensing was an effec-
tive way to speed the learning process and that Korea could reduce its develop-
ment costs because substantial R&D costs had already been incurred by the li-
censors. Figure 4 shows that Korean industries and large firms relied heavily on
foreign licensing to obtain technology, especially highly sophisticated technol-
ogy. Thus, although Korea achieved a leading position in world markets in such
industries as dynamic random access memory (DRAM) semiconductors, con-
tainer vessels, steel, videocassette recorders, and microwave ovens, the price of
achieving this status was very high.
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Evolution of S&T Policy
Even though new policies to produce an indigenous technological capacity were
slow in coming, by the early 1990s key policy officials were advocating increased
support for Korea-based S&T. Despite the financial crisis of 1997 and the ensu-
ing economic hardships, the Korean government has strengthened its commit-
ment to S&T development by raising its R&D expenditures from 3.6 percent ($3
billion) of its total budget in 1998 to 4.7 percent or $3.8 billion in 2002. The
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number of researchers in S&T has grown from 18,500 to 160,000 over the past
two decades (KOSIS 2003).
This quantitative growth has been accompanied by rapid increases in S&T
outputs—international scientific publications and international patents, for ex-
ample. The World Competitiveness Yearbook for 2002 (IMD 2002) places Korea
10th in the world in S&T competitiveness on the basis of indicators such as R&D
investment, number of researchers, degree of protection of intellectual property
rights (IPR), and others. S&T expansion has also brought about rising concerns over
effectiveness as well as the efficiency of the investments.
Profile and Achievement of R&D Activities
Korea’s capability in S&T has grown steadily since the 1980s together with its
rapid economic development. The amount of R&D investment as well as the
number of researchers has increased remarkably. Investment in R&D increased
over time from 212 billion won in 1980 to 13.9 trillion won in 2000 (see Table 3).
The increase between 1999 and 2000 was 16.2 percent. Investment as a propor-
tion of GDP has risen from 0.56 percent in 1980 to 2.65 percent in 2000.
In 2000 the government and the public sector provided 24.9 percent (3.5
billion won) of the total R&D funding, whereas the private sector contributed
75.1 percent (see Figure 5). Before 1983, however, R&D expenditures were
divided almost evenly between the private sector and the government–public
sector.
In 2000, research institutes spent 2.0 billion won (that is, 14.7 percent of
total R&D expenditure). Universities and colleges disbursed 1.6 billion won (11.3
percent) and companies expended 10.3 billion won (74 percent). Total R&D ex-
Table 3: Trend of R&D Expenditures in Korea, 1970–2000
  Year          R&D           R&D                          GDP          Ratio to
                   expenditure             expenditure               (billion won               GDP
                   (billion won)          growth rate (%)        current prices              (%)
1970 11 n.a. 2.725 0.39
1975 43 304.3 10.228 0.42
1980 212 396.3 37.789 0.56
1985 1,237 484.3 81.312 1.52
1990 3,350 170.8 178.797 1.87
1995 9,441 181.8 377.350 2.50
1996 10,878 15.2 418.479 2.60
1997 12,186 12.0 453.276 2.69
1998 11,337 –7.0 444.367 2.55
1999 11,922 5.2 482.744 2.47
2000 13,849 16.2 521.959 2.65
Source: KOSIS various.
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penditure classified by type of work shows that, in 2000, 1.8 billion won (12.6
percent of total) was invested in basic research, 3.4 billion won (24.3 percent) in
applied research, and 8.7 billion won (63.1 percent) in development research.
Korea increased its R&D intensity steadily, but “it was not until in the 1990s
[that] Korea finally reached the level of Western countries” (Sakakibara and Cho
2000, 4).
Indicators of R&D achievement are the total number of patents filed and
awarded (Figure 6) as well as the import of technology (Figure 3). The recent
trend in Korea is that R&D expenditure has produced more innovative and value-
added results. After 1994, the number of patent applications increased dramati-
cally, and after 1997 the number of patent registrations also grew.
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An international comparison of patents—an indicator of R&D—is presented
in Table 4. Dahlman and Andersson (2000) diagnosed Korean R&D activities as
“high input” with “biased composition of output”; in other words, the generation
of codified knowledge (in the form of patents and publications) is relatively low
compared with the knowledge embodied in traded goods.
Table 4: Patents in Korea Compared with Patents in Selected Countries,
2000
  Patents              Korea France      Germany       Japan          UK            U.S.
  Applications 172.2 160.2 262.6 486.2 233.3 331.8
 (1,000 cases)
 Registration 35.0 36.4 41.6 125.9 33.8 157.5
 (1,000 cases)
Source: WIPO 2000.
Challenges for Korea’s Innovation System
Several recent reports (Dahlman and Andersson 2000; MOST 2000) have set
forth the challenges facing the Korean innovation system and have made recom-
mendations for meeting those challenges. Among the changes needed in a broader
context are reforms of the Korean education system; greater interaction and alli-
ances among government, universities, and corporations; continued deregulation
of key technology sectors, particularly those associated with information and
communication technologies; greater exposure to, and alliances with, interna-
tional institutions in order to tap into global knowledge networks; greater trans-
parency in financial markets; and greater flexibility in labor markets.
Although a comprehensive approach, encompassed by the above list of
changes, will be necessary, this book concentrates on specific reforms to the in-
stitutions and priorities of the R&D system itself. The main components of the
formal R&D system are the public and private universities, the government re-
search institutes (GRIs), and certain corporations (usually they are large compa-
nies that are part of a chaebol, with heavy concentrations in a few areas such as
communications equipment, computers, and semiconductors). Also, self-financ-
ing is predominant in both the public and private sectors—government funds
more than 80 percent of the GRIs, and industry funds more than 90 percent of its
own research. Universities show more diversity, but they carry out only a small
fraction of research activities.
At this point in its development history, the most important weakness of the
current Korean R&D system is the lack of a solid, comprehensive, basic research
effort. While Korea ranks well among OECD countries in total R&D spending as
a percentage of GDP, it ranks almost last in spending on basic research as a
portion of total R&D. While it is true that some large Korean firms perform more
basic research than their private-sector counterparts in industrialized countries,
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the public research sectors in Korea—the universities and the GRIs—spend less
and perform much less basic research than comparable institutions in almost all
other OECD countries. The major problem lies with the universities, which, in
great contrast to universities in other countries, are still oriented toward general
education and generally lack specialized advanced facilities and programs in key
physical and biological sciences. This flaw is accentuated in the private universi-
ties, where funds for basic science are quite low or nonexistent (Dahlman and
Andersson 2000).
In the early 1980s, aware of the general lack of a domestic knowledge base,
the Korean government launched a series of national R&D programs (NRDPs) to
be run out of the GRIs. The aim and purpose of these new national programs
were to provide depth in research areas that were not likely to be covered by the
private sector and to provide a resource for more upstream research in general.
Unfortunately, though there have been some successes, by and large the GRIs
have been much too oriented to targeted research in whatever technologies repre-
sented the current fad, and the GRIs have resisted giving priority to more basic,
upstream research where payoffs were not readily demonstrable. One reason for
this was the tendency for ministries of the government to use GRIs merely as
agencies to carry out their own research priorities. In addition, GRIs tended to
follow the lead of the private sector, resulting in a good deal of overlap with
corporate R&D efforts. Most fundamentally, compounded with the weakness of
the universities (about two-thirds of all NRDP funds have gone to GRIs, with
only 9 percent to universities), the misplaced priorities of the GRIs have resulted
in a general lack of long-term basic research in the Korean innovation system.
Finally, structural imbalances in the private sector contribute to a lack of
productivity in the Korean R&D effort. Large companies that are part of one of
the chaebol perform almost all of the private-sector R&D. Generally, this R&D
is conducted in large, centralized laboratories that are tied tightly to existing prod-
uct lines and near-term research. While they do perform some basic research, in
general they lack flexibility and creativity. Small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) perform virtually no research, either alone or in conjunction with gov-
ernment-sponsored programs (Dahlman and Andersson 2000).
A New S&T Policy Agenda
Korea needs to reorient its R&D strategies in relation to both priorities and man-
agement. For building a domestic knowledge and technology base, over time the
universities should be given new roles, responsibilities, and resources. They must
strengthen their basic research capabilities as well as create a linkage with ad-
vanced scientific education. The highly successful U.S. university system com-
bines top-flight research with a deep commitment to advanced scientific educa-
tion and the production of graduates with doctorate degrees across a wide spec-
trum of scientific disciplines. Although it will take time, the Korean government
should begin immediately to reprogram and add new resources for basic research
in the universities. Over the long run, most government-sponsored basic research
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should be directed to a new breed of research universities. In turn, the universi-
ties, under government supervision to minimize  duplication, should begin to
specialize in particular scientific disciplines (MOST 2003).
A reorientation of the GRIs is also necessary. Like the universities, they should
be pushed to contribute much more to the knowledge base and to realign their
research priorities away from program areas that already receive strong attention
and resources from the private sector. This reorientation could be assured by the
establishment of clearer guidelines for project funding and a tighter system of
GRI program evaluation.
The government should also explore new symbiotic relations between the
GRIs and the universities. Centers of scientific excellence could be created through
alliances between individual GRIs and universities. It is also important to make it
much easier for scientists to operate in multiple environments and move more
freely among universities, GRIs, and corporate laboratories. Collaboration be-
tween universities and corporate laboratories—which should be monitored care-
fully to avoid distortion of science priorities—should be encouraged. One incen-
tive that could be introduced is a system by which the universities and the private
sector share the proceeds from intellectual property in joint projects.
Also, the government should place major emphasis on strengthening the tech-
nological capabilities of the private-sector SMEs. The government could redirect
the priorities of the GRIs and mandate new programs that link up with associa-
tions of SMEs in strategic program areas. In addition, both the United States and
the European Union (EU) have created successful programs to increase the ab-
sorptive capacity of their SMEs, and the Korean government should explore similar
diffusion efforts.
Korea’s Northeast Asia Business Hub Strategy
Korea’s traditional export-oriented development strategy was based mainly on
mobilizing Korea’s abundant labor force to produce manufacturing goods for
export to the world market. The R&D strategy described in the preceding section
represents an extension of that vision, with the goal of steady advancement up the
technological competitive ladder in manufacturing goods. In January 2002, Presi-
dent Kim Dae-jung formally espoused a complementary strategy—the Northeast
Asia business hub strategy—and announced several concrete actions to fulfill
that goal (MOFE 2002).
The Northeast Asia business hub strategy has been described as an inward-
globalization strategy to make Korea a “global business-friendly economy that
acts as the regional center for trade, financial flows, and information flows by
land, sea, and air from neighboring countries as well as from MNCs [multina-
tional corporations]” (Ahn 2003, 11). When fully developed, it is expected to be
a closely integrated regional trade and investment community that includes China,
Japan, Korea, and—later—Asian Russia. Korean government officials are can-
did in admitting that the driving force behind regional integration in Northeast
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Asia stems “in large part from the emergence of China as a world economic
power” (Ahn 2003, 10).6
One foundation of the new strategy is based solidly on geographic propin-
quity: Korea is located between Japan (the center of a Pacific Ocean economy)
and China (the center of a newly emerging continental economy). Trade among
these countries (and Russia) has grown tremendously over the past decade. Fur-
ther, intraregional trade as a percentage of total trade among these trading part-
ners has also increased greatly in recent years.
Table 5, which traces container shipments between Korea and Japan and
between Korea and China in recent years, also highlights the strategic geographic
advantage of Korea within the region.
Korea will have to make a number of changes in policy (and national charac-
ter) in order to become a truly competitive regional hub. This study will focus on
two of the most essential: welcoming and utilizing FDI as a key development
tool, and deregulating and liberalizing the business services (including financial,
distribution, and legal services) that provide the foundation for international
commerce.
6. Obviously, one difficult obstacle in the way of all these plans is the continued and, indeed,
growing alienation of North Korea from the Asian community as well as the world community.
The assumption—large though it may be—of this book is that somehow, at least in the medium
term, North Korea will be integrated into the regional economic and political system. Note also
that, in addition to the impact of China, regional integration in Northeast Asia has also been
spurred by the effects of the financial crisis of the 1990s and the decision of the United States
to give regional trade policies priority, as evidenced first by NAFTA and now by the negotia-
tion of the FTAA.
Table 5: Container Shipments on Korea-China Route and Korea-Japan
Route, 1995–98 (in TEU)
                                     1995             1996     1997            1998
Korea-China Local 160,736 208,552 229,945 234,058
Feeder 91,295 85,322 84,215 104,361
Total 252,034 293,874 314,160 337,519
China-Korea Local 145,753 155,297 185,845 132,853
Feeder 171,505 163,339 233,853 259,858
Total 317,258 318,636 419,698 392,711
Korea-Japan Local 190,990 189,752 191,663 201,332
Feeder 24,743 30,130 39,195 31,400
Total 215,733 219,886 230,858 232,732
Japan-Korea Local 141,658 139,488 139,807 105,549
Feeder 14,075 13,941 13,549 13,953
Total 155,733 153,429 153,356 119,502
Source: Ahn 2002, 14–5.
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FDI as an Instrument of Korea’s Overall Development Policy
In the history of Korea’s modern economic development from the early 1960s
until the Asian financial crisis, FDI did not figure prominently in Korea’s devel-
opment paradigm (Figure 7). The Korean government preferred foreign borrow-
ing to FDI because of its fear of Korean industries being dominated by foreign
entities. Only at the end of the 1980s did the government finally acknowledge
that FDI could be a key channel to introduce not only the equity capital but also
the management know-how and technological base essential to modern business
ventures. In the 1990s, the government moved gradually to liberalize its FDI
policy.
The sectoral distribution of FDI (Table 6) largely followed the priorities laid
down in the successive five-year development plans. Investors’ motives have
also changed over time. Until the mid-1980s, low-cost labor was the main advan-
tage of investing in Korea. Korea’s manufacturing sector has been the largest
recipient of FDI, but its share has been declining over time, from 87 percent
during 1962–71 to 45.15 percent during 1992–2001. FDI in primary sectors—
agriculture, fishing, and mining—has been insignificant (consistently less than 1
percent). More recently, several manufacturing sectors that had been the leading
recipients of FDI earlier in the 1990s—including chemicals, electronics, trans-
portation equipment, and machinery—experienced a relative decline in foreign
investment.
A great change in Korea’s FDI regime occurred during the Asian financial
crisis of 1997–98. As a result of the paradigm change in Korea’s FDI regime, the
years of the late 1990s witnessed bursts of FDI inflows into Korea. The Kim
Dae-jung government that took office in February 1998 embarked on major eco-
nomic reforms, including the strong promotion of FDI in Korea with the aim of
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overcoming the financial crisis and strengthening the international competitive-
ness of the Korean economy.
In 2002, as a part of its regional hub strategy, the Korean government also
offered substantial incentives to foreign investors in a new group of special eco-
nomic zones, where large-scale foreign investors have been granted a 100 per-
cent tax exemption for the first seven years and a 50 percent reduction for three
additional years. There is also a 100 percent exemption from all customs duties,
special excise taxes, and value-added taxes for three years as well as exemption
from land and property taxes for five years, with a potential 50 percent reduction
for an additional three years. Similar inducements are being granted to small-
scale investors.
There are also special regulatory exemptions. In the special economic zones,
foreigners are allowed to set up their own schools, hospitals, and pharmacies.
Finally, the zones allow much more flexible labor market regulations (Ahn 2003,
14–5).
These measures potentially add up to a new era of openness to foreign in-
vestment as a means of introducing both new technologies and management tech-
niques to the Korea economy. What will take more time, however, is changing
the mind-set of both bureaucrats and citizens so that foreign takeovers of domes-
tic companies and new greenfield investments are no longer viewed as threats to
the national patrimony but as valuable tools to increase competitiveness in world
markets and enhance the standard of living for all Koreans.
Services: The Vital Link
As noted above, the second pillar of Korea’s business hub strategy is a strategic
approach toward the evolution of Korea into a major services economy. The long-
neglected services sector in Korea is increasingly seen as the most vital element
of a twenty-first century economy (Noland 2003). The rationale for this strategic
change has been persuasively set forth by Kim Hwi-seok (2003), of the Korea
Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, who recently stated:
To date Korea has concentrated on a strategy of using its manufactur-
ing industry as the primary vehicle for economic growth. However,
the growth potential of the manufacturing industry has significantly
eroded due to the emergence of newly industrialized economies such
as China... (T)he time has come to develop new methods to utilize the
long-neglected services industry as a momentum for economic growth...
(W)ith the establishment of effective strategies and the efficient distri-
bution of policy resources, the service industry does have the poten-
tial to serve as a high-powered vehicle for economic growth.
Since the mid-1970s, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of
Korean GDP devoted to services (Table 7). Table 6 shows also that, between
1992 and 2001, services received more than half of all FDI: 54.37 percent.
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Table 7: Korea’s Service Sector, Percentage of GDP, 1970–2001
    Year            Contribution of Total Services-               Services-Producing
            Producing Industries to GDP            Industries as Percentage
             (current prices, billion won)                       of GDP
1970 .956 35.06
1975 3.466 33.89
1980 13.768 36.43
1985 31.710 39.00
1990 72.984 40.82
1995 377.350 43.84
1996 418.479 44.03
1997 453.276 44.20
1998 444.367 44.21
1999 482.744 45.68
2000 521.959 45.78
2001 545.013 47.24
Source: BOK 2003.
The leading recipients of FDI were financial services, hotels, wholesale and
retail services, and other services that include telecommunications, consulting,
market research, and advertising. Figure 8 traces the growth of key services sec-
tors and shows the striking takeoff in growth during the 1990s.
As a result of the reforms undertaken during the 1990s financial crisis, many
new business services sectors—including real estate rental and sales, securities
and insurance, commodity exchanges, and investment trusts—were opened fully
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to FDI. Only a few services sectors are either still fully closed (radio and televi-
sion broadcasting) to outside investment or partly restricted (publishing, air trans-
portation, telecommunications, specialized banking, cable and satellite broad-
casting, and electric power).
An Illustrative Example: Distribution Services
Kim June-dong (2003) recounts how the recent experience of the distribution
services sector serves as a model to illustrate how liberalization and economic
reforms can increase productivity, serve as a magnet for foreign investment, and
produce spillover effects on the entire economy. If Korea is to attain its goal of
becoming a true business hub, the model provided by distribution services must
be replicated in other services areas.
Until the mid-1990s, distribution services was one of the least productive
and developed sectors in Korea. As late as 1996, mom-and-pop stores with fewer
than five employees made up 80 percent of Korea’s retail market. Over the past
half decade, however, a dramatic transformation has taken place in the wholesale
and retail markets. This transformation has two sources: deregulating internally
and lifting restrictions on FDI in the distribution services sector.
Among the most important reforms was the elimination of store- and space-
related limits on retailing for both domestic and foreign firms. This resulted in a
large increase in the number of large-scale discount stores—“hypermarkets,” the
Koreans call them. By mid-2002, more than 200 hypermarkets had been estab-
lished, with more than 25 percent of them foreign owned (Table 8).
In turn, competition in Korean retail markets changed markedly from a manu-
facturer-dominated structure to one strongly influenced by the market power of
Table 8: Establishment of Hypermarkets in Korea, 1997–2002
  Store name      Year of                                 Number of stores
            entry
              1997     1998     1999      2000      2001    Jan.–June 2002
Carrefour 1996 3 6 11 20 22 22
Wal-Mart 1996 4 4 5 6 9 12
Costco 1998a 2 3 3 4 5 5
Tesco 1999b 1 1 2 7 14 16
Total–foreign companies 10 14 21 37 50 55
Total–Korean companies 48 67 86 114 141 152
Share of total number of stores (%)
 Total–foreign companies 17.2 17.3 19.6 24.5 26.2 26.6
 Total–Korean companies 82.8 82.7 80.4 75.5 73.8 73.4
Source: Kim J. 2003, 216.
a In 1994 Costco first entered the Korean market by acquiring a local company
b In 1997 Tesco first entered the Korean market by acquiring a local company
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large-scale domestic and foreign retail companies. Manufacturer domination had
operated to deter productivity improvement and price competition. The increased
buying power of the new retail operations shifted pricing power away from the
manufacturers, however, and resulted in price competition. Further, foreign mul-
tinational firms (and domestic firms soon after) introduced advanced techniques
in merchandising and inventory management as well as new technologies such as
point-of-sale systems.7 Figure 9 shows the steeply rising trends of sales per em-
ployee for hypermarkets, particularly in the late 1990s.
The recent history of the Korean distribution sector—especially one major
branch, retail sales—demonstrates the kind of evolution that both the public and
the private sectors in Korea will have to plan and execute in order for Korea to
become a business hub in the foreseeable future. Observers also point out that no
single sector can advance on its own—ancillary activities such as legal, financial
and insurance, electronic commerce, and telecommunications services will need
to undergo comparable advances for the full effects of the potential services revo-
lution to be realized.
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7. Point-of-sale systems allow managers to have real-time information about all aspects of the
sales process; they include computerized cash registers, optical scanners, magnetic cards, and
complete transportation and inventory information.
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3
The Evolution of Korea’s Trade and
Investment Patterns
Trade-oriented industrialization has been the basic growth strategy of Korea since
the early 1960s, making foreign trade inseparable from industrial development.
When the first five-year plan (1962–66) began, the total value of Korean exports
amounted to only $55 million, but by 2002 this had increased to $161 billion.
This rapid expansion of exports and its interrelationship with Korea’s growth
strategy, policy instruments, incentive systems, and institutional arrangements
were examined in Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 provides a detailed look at the post–
Korean War history of Korea’s trade and investment patterns and relationships.
Overview of Korea’s Trade and Investment Patterns
The efficacy of export-led growth has been an article of faith for policymakers in
East Asia. Starting as one of the Asian Tigers, Korea has focused on exports of
manufactures (especially to the United States) and has relied on the openness of
its trading partners to sustain its pace of expansion (Table 9).
Korean Trade since 1960
Korea’s trade statistics show dramatic export growth between 1960 and 1980
(Table 10). Spurred by the government’s industrial policy, Korea’s industrializa-
tion focused on increasing exports, and export growth rates during the period
outpaced import growth rates. In the 1980s, both export and import growth rates
slowed, and trade became more balanced. The trade balance began to deteriorate
in 1990, however, and reached a record of –$20.6 billion in 1996. As a result of
the 1997 financial crisis, growth stagnated even though the Korean won dropped
precipitously in value. Exports dropped slightly, but imports decreased dramati-
cally. As Korea’s economy was restored, both imports and exports rebounded,
showing healthy year-on-year growth. Although Korea’s economy experienced a
setback in 2001—with negative growth rates for both imports and exports—it
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has run a trade surplus since 1998. By 2002 both exports and imports had sur-
passed nominal levels attained before 1997.
Table 9: East Asian Countries’ Dependence on Exports and Percentage of
Exports to the United States, 2001
     Countries       Exports as percentage              Percentage of exports
              of GDP   to United States
China 26.77 24.34
Hong Kong 108.35 20.93
Japan 9.75 30.07
Korea 35.49 20.93
Singapore 142.11 15.41
Taiwan 43.54 22.50
Source: ADB 2002.
Table 10: Korea’s Trade Statistics, selected years, 1960–2002
  Year     Exports             Export             Imports             Import         Trade Balance
            ($ millions)   Growth, 5 year   ($ millions)   Growth, 5 year      ($ millions)
      Period (%)                               Period (%)
 1960 33 n.a. 344 n.a. –311
 1965 175 430 463 35 –288
 1970 835 377 1,983 328 –1,148
 1975 5,081 509 7,274 267 –2,193
 1980 17,504 244 22,291 207 –4,787
 1985 30,283 73 31,135 206 –852
 1990 65,015 115 69,843 40 –4,828
 1995 125,058 30 135,119 32 –10,061
 2000 172,268 20 160,481 34 11,787
 2002 161,071 7 150,055 6 11,016
Source: KITA various.
Korea’s Major Import Partners (1980–2002)
Throughout the past two decades, Japan has been Korea’s biggest import partner,
followed by the United States (Table 11). However, the trade shares of Japan and
the United States were significantly reduced by 2002 owing to the growing im-
portance of China as one of Korea’s major sources of imports. China represented
only 3 percent ($2.27 billion) of Korea’s total imports in 1990, but China’s share
grew to 11 percent ($15.72 billion) of total imports by 2002.
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Table 11: Sources of Korea’s Imports, 1980, 1990, 2002
                 1980                                1990                                2002
          Total imports =         Total imports =        Total imports =
          $21.95 billion                       $69.84 billion        $137.55 billion
 Rank    Country         %     Rank     Country           %    Rank      Country        %
1 Japan 27 1 Japan 27 1 Japan 20
2 U.S. 22 2 U.S. 24 2 U.S. 15
3 Saudi Arabia 15 3 Germany 5 3 China 11
4 Kuwait 8 4 China 3 4 Saudi Arabia 5
5 Australia 3 5 Saudi Arabia 2 5 Australia 4
6 Others 25 6 Others 39 6 Others 45
Source: KITA various.
Saudi Arabia, like Japan and the United States, has been one of Korea’s five
main sources of imports since 1980, which indicates the importance of oil im-
ports for the Korean economy, in particular during the 1980s. Saudi Arabia pro-
vided 15 percent ($3.29 billion) of Korea’s total imports in 1980, a share that
decreased significantly by 1990 ($1.72 billion) but increased to 5 percent in 2002
($6.9 billion). Korea’s imports from other countries continued to increase be-
tween 1980 and 2002, a trend that indicates a diversification of Korea’s imports.
Excluding Korea’s five major sources of imports, the number of countries
that provided more than 1.4 percent of Korea’s total imports increased from 6 in
1980 to 10 in 1990. The number reached 12 in 2002, reflecting Korea’s continu-
ing import diversification. These countries included countries of Southeast Asia
and East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan), Europe (Germany, the United
Kingdom [UK], Italy, and France), and the Middle East (United Arab Emirates
and Kuwait).
Korea’s Major Export Partners (1980–2002)
Since 1980, the United States has been Korea’s biggest export market except in
1973—before 1980 the United States ranked second (see Table 12). The share of
Korea’s exports to the United States has decreased significantly, however, from
30 percent ($19.36 billion) in 1990 to 20 percent ($29.83 billion) in 2002. A
significant trend between 1990 and 2002 was a fast-growing Chinese market for
Korea’s exports. In 1980 and 1990, the amount of Korea’s exports to China was
insignificant, but in 2002 China took in about 14 percent ($21.23 billion) of
Korea’s total exports and had replaced Japan as Korea’s second-biggest export
market. The growing share of the Chinese market for Korea’s exports is a sign of
Korea’s export-market diversification.
Before the surge of exports to China, more than 40 percent of Korea’s ex-
ports headed to the United States and Japan. China’s emergence as a major ex-
port market for Korean products has lessened Korea’s heavy concentration on
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the U.S. and Japanese markets. Table 12 shows that the shares of Korea’s three
major export markets had become more evenly distributed by 2002. Also, Hong
Kong sustained its share—approximately 5 percent of Korea’s total exports—
throughout the period. In 2002, other countries took 47 percent of Korea’s ex-
ports, which was larger than their 38 percent in 1990. The number of countries
whose share of Korea’s exports was greater than 1.4 percent grew from 8 in 1980
and 1990 to 12 in 2002. These countries included Southeast Asian and East Asian
countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, and Singapore), European countries (UK,
Netherlands, France, and Germany), Canada, and Australia.
Korea’s Market Export Share and Competitiveness
According to the World Investment Report 2002 (UNCTAD 2002), significant
changes are taking place in world trade, and a number of developing countries
and economies in transition are among the principal beneficiaries. Korea is as
well. The report states: “[I]f one focuses on those economies that have gained
market share during 1985–2000, . . a list [emerges] containing mostly developing
economies, led by China, and also including a number of economies in transi-
tion” (UNCTAD 2002, 143). Korea is the third country on the list of overall
winners (Figure 10).
Korea’s overall market share increased from 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent dur-
ing the period of 1985–2000, with export success based largely on high- and
medium-technology manufactures (Figure 11): exports of high-technology manu-
factures rose from 14 percent to 38 percent of total exports, and exports of me-
dium-technology products rose from 22 percent to 29 percent.
Five high-technology exports (semiconductors, computers and computer parts
and accessories, telecom equipment, and electrical machinery, and eletrical ap-
paratus) alone accounted for the majority of Korea’s export products. Passenger
motor vehicles as well as ships, boats, and floating structures represented another
significant export item (Table 13).
Table 12: Destinations for Korea’s Exports, 1980, 1990, 2002
                  1980                                  1990                                2002
           Total exports =                      Total exports =                    Total exports =
           $17.37 billion                        $65.02 billion                       $147.65 billion
 Rank    Country           %     Rank     Country          %     Rank    Country         %
1 U.S. 27 1 U.S. 30 1 U.S. 20
2 Japan 17 2 Japan 19 2 China 14
3 Hong Kong 5 3 Hong Kong 6 3 Japan 9
4 Saudi Arabia 5 4 Germany 4 4 Hong Kong 6
5 Germany 5 5 Singapore 3 5 Taiwan 4
6 Others 41 6 Others 38 6 Others 47
Source: KITA various.
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Figure 10: Winner Economies, based on percentage of export market 
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Source: UNCTAD 2002, 144.
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Figure 11: Korea s Competitiveness in the World Export Market, 
1985 2000, percentage of Korean exports
Source: UNCTAD 2002, 177.
Note: Low technology comprises textiles, garments, paper products, glass and steel, and 
jewelery; medium technology comprises products of the automotive industry, processing 
industry, and engineering industry; and high technology comprises electronics, pharmaceutical 
products, turbines, aircraft, and optical and measuring instruments.
Percentage
Changes in Korea’s Trade Structure
Changes in Korea’s export structure have led to related changes in its industrial
structure as a result of the export-oriented industrialization strategy.    Pronounced
shifts in the composition of exports have occurred regularly since the first five-
r  1 : ’ etitivenes  in the World Export Market,
–    orts
r  10:  r conomies, based on percentage of export market
–2
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year plan in 1962. One gauge of this changing export structure is the list in Table
14 of Korea’s top five exports in various years.
Along with the rising proportion of manufactured goods for export, the lead-
ing types of manufactured exports also changed. During the 1960s, the major
manufactured exports were labor-intensive goods such as plywood, wigs, and
sweaters—all of which depended on relatively simple technology. In the 1970s,
the major export goods shifted to textiles, ships, steel plate, and other products
which relied on capital and somewhat more complex technology and more highly
skilled labor. By the early 1980s, export commodities had become even more
capital intensive. The year 1986 may have been a turning point, a time when
manufactured exports shifted decisively to skill-intensive goods such as comput-
ers, semiconductors, color televisions, and automobiles.
The pattern of predominant export manufactures shifted over time from (a)
labor-intensive goods, to (b) other capital-intensive goods, to (c) capital-inten-
sive and skill-intensive goods, to (d) capital-and-technology-intensive and high-
wage goods, and now to (e) research-intensive, capital-intensive, and high-skill-
intensive goods.
Korea’s imports reflect its lack of natural resources as well as its national
trade promotion policies. Korea’s industrialization has needed to be undergirded
by imported energy (see Table 15). Further, Korea’s promotion of heavy indus-
tries in the 1970s and technology-intensive industries more recently has caused a
Table 13: Korea’s 10 Major Export Commodities, 1991, 1996, and 2001,
in millions of U.S. dollars
  SITC                     Product                      1991            1996            2001
776 Thermionic, cold cathode 6,645 17,305 14,742
or photo-cathode valves,
tubes, and other semiconductors
764 Telecommunications equipment, 2,116 4,404 12,273
not specified elsewhere
781 Motor cars and other motor vehicles 2,143 9,089 12,029
793 Ship, boats, and floating structures 4,126 7,127 9,699
334 Petroleum oils and oils from 1,396 3,678 7,736
bituminous minerals
752 Automatic data processing machines 2,106 4,707 7,485
759 Parts suitable for use with various 688 733 5,714
office machines and data processing
machines
653 Fabrics, woven, of man-made textile 3,729 6,273 3,390
materials
655 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 520 1,447 2,478
775 Household-type electrical and 1,025 1,909 2,201
nonelectrical equipment
Source: UNCTAD 2002.
Note: SITC refers to standard international trade classification category.
The Evolution of Korea’s Trade and Investment Patterns     35
Ta
bl
e 1
4:
 
K
or
ea
’s
 M
ajo
r E
xp
or
ts
, 1
98
0–
20
02
, b
y 
H
SK
 tw
o-
di
gi
t c
od
e
 
R
an
k 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 1
98
0 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
19
90
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  1
99
5 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
00
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  2
00
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
It
em
s  
   
   
   
   
   
   
%
   
   
   
   
   
  I
te
m
s  
   
   
   
   
   
   
%
   
   
   
   
   
   
 It
em
s  
   
   
   
   
   
%
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It
em
s  
   
   
   
   
   
 %
   
   
   
   
   
   
 It
em
s  
   
   
   
   
   
  
%
1
El
ec
tri
ca
l m
ac
hi
ne
ry
11
.1
8
El
ec
tri
ca
l m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
22
.7
2
El
ec
tri
ca
l m
ac
hi
ne
ry
30
.4
5
El
ec
tri
ca
l m
ac
hi
ne
ry
26
.9
2
El
ec
tri
ca
l m
ac
hi
ne
ry
27
.0
4
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
nd
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
nd
an
d 
 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
n
d
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
nd
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
nd
pa
rts
pa
rts
pa
rts
pa
rts
pa
rts
2
A
rt
ic
le
s o
f a
pp
ar
el
9.
56
N
uc
le
ar
 re
ac
to
rs
,
8.
02
N
uc
le
ar
 re
ac
to
rs
,
9.
85
N
uc
le
ar
 re
ac
to
rs
,
17
.2
6
N
uc
le
ar
 re
ac
to
rs
,
17
.0
7
an
d 
cl
ot
hi
ng
bo
ile
rs
, m
ac
hi
ne
ry
bo
ile
rs
, m
ac
hi
ne
ry
bo
ile
rs
, m
ac
hi
ne
ry
bo
ile
rs
, m
ac
hi
ne
ry
ac
ce
ss
o
rie
s
3
Ir
on
 a
nd
 st
ee
l
6.
71
Fo
ot
w
ea
r, 
he
ad
ge
ar
,
6.
62
Ve
hi
cl
es
 o
th
er
 th
an
7.
48
Ve
hi
cl
es
 o
th
er
 th
an
8.
86
Ve
hi
cl
es
 o
th
er
 th
an
10
.6
3
u
m
br
el
la
s, 
w
al
ki
ng
ra
ilw
ay
 o
r t
ra
m
w
ay
ra
ilw
ay
 o
r t
ra
m
w
ay
ra
ilw
ay
 o
r t
ra
m
w
ay
st
ic
ks
r
o
lli
ng
-s
to
ck
ro
lli
ng
-s
to
ck
ro
lli
ng
-s
to
ck
4
Fo
ot
w
ea
r, 
he
ad
ge
ar
,
5.
23
A
rti
cl
es
 o
f a
pp
ar
el
5.
08
M
an
-m
ad
e 
fil
am
en
ts
4.
92
M
in
er
al
 fu
el
s,
5.
44
Sh
ip
s, 
bo
at
s, 
an
d
6.
57
u
m
br
el
la
s, 
w
al
ki
ng
an
d 
cl
ot
hi
ng
m
in
er
al
 o
ils
,
flo
at
in
g 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
st
ic
ks
ac
ce
ss
o
rie
s
bi
tu
m
in
ou
s 
su
bs
ta
nc
es
5
A
rt
ic
le
s o
f i
ro
n 
or
4.
85
Ir
on
 a
nd
 st
ee
l
4.
68
Sh
ip
s, 
bo
at
s, 
an
d
4.
42
Sh
ip
s, 
bo
at
s, 
an
d
4.
78
Pl
as
tic
s 
an
d
4.
50
st
ee
l
flo
at
in
g 
str
uc
tu
re
s
flo
at
in
g 
str
uc
tu
re
s
pl
as
tic
 a
rti
cl
es
So
ur
ce
: K
IT
A 
v
ar
io
us
.
36 Korea in Asia
Ta
bl
e 1
5:
 
K
or
ea
’s
 M
ajo
r I
m
po
rt
s, 
19
80
–2
00
2,
 b
y 
H
SK
 tw
o-
di
gi
t c
od
e
R
an
k 
   
   
   
   
   
   
19
80
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 1
99
0 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
19
95
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
00
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
20
02
 
 
 
 
It
em
s  
   
   
   
   
   
 %
   
   
   
   
   
  I
te
m
s  
   
   
   
   
   
  %
   
   
   
   
   
  I
te
m
s  
   
   
   
   
   
   
%
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It
em
s  
   
   
   
   
   
  %
   
   
   
   
   
   
 It
em
s  
   
   
   
   
   
   
%
1
M
in
er
al
 fu
el
s,
30
.2
5
N
uc
le
ar
 re
ac
to
rs
,
17
.7
4
N
uc
le
ar
 re
ac
to
rs
,
17
.6
0
M
in
er
al
 fu
el
s,
23
.6
8
M
in
er
al
 fu
el
s,
21
.3
3
m
in
er
al
 o
ils
,
bo
ile
rs
,
bo
ile
rs
,
m
in
er
al
 o
ils
,
m
in
ie
ra
l o
il,
bi
tu
m
in
ou
s
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
bi
tu
m
in
ou
s
bi
tu
m
in
ou
s
su
bs
ta
nc
es
su
bs
ta
nc
es
su
bs
ta
nc
e
2
N
uc
le
ar
 re
ac
to
rs
,
9.
38
M
in
er
al
 fu
el
s,
15
.7
8
El
ec
tri
ca
l m
ac
hi
ne
ry
El
ec
tri
ca
l m
ac
hi
ne
ry
El
ec
tri
ca
l m
ac
hi
ne
ry
bo
ile
rs
,
m
in
er
al
 o
ils
,
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t p
ar
ts
14
.3
0
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t p
ar
ts
22
.1
3
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t p
ar
ts
21
.0
4
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
bi
tu
m
in
ou
s
su
bs
ta
nc
es
3
El
ec
tri
ca
l
6.
76
El
ec
tri
ca
l
12
.5
1
M
in
er
al
 fu
el
s,
14
.0
7
N
uc
le
ar
 re
ac
to
rs
,
13
.0
1
N
uc
le
ar
 re
ac
to
rs
,
11
.7
3
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
n
d
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
n
d
m
in
er
al
 o
ils
,
bo
ile
rs
, m
ac
hi
ne
ry
bo
ile
rs
, m
ac
hi
ne
ry
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
nd
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
n
d
bi
tu
m
in
ou
s
pa
rts
pa
rts
su
bs
ta
nc
es
4
Ce
re
al
s
4.
79
Ir
on
 a
nd
 st
ee
l
 
 
5.
11
Ir
on
 a
nd
 st
ee
l
5.
11
O
pt
ic
al
, p
ho
to
gr
ap
hi
c,
4.
21
O
pt
ic
al
, p
ho
to
gr
ap
hi
c,
ci
ne
m
at
og
ra
ph
ic
,
ci
ne
m
at
og
ra
ph
ic
,
m
ea
su
rin
g 
de
vi
ce
s
m
ea
su
rin
g 
de
vi
ce
s
4.
10
5
O
rg
an
ic
4.
50
O
rg
an
ic
 
 
4.
92
O
pt
ic
al
, p
ho
to
gr
ap
hi
c,
4.
45
Ir
on
 a
nd
 st
ee
l
3.
73
Ir
on
 a
nd
 st
ee
l
3.
99
ch
em
ic
al
s
ch
em
ic
al
s
ci
ne
m
at
og
ra
ph
ic
,
m
ea
su
rin
g 
de
vi
ce
s
So
ur
ce
: K
IT
A 
v
ar
io
us
.
The Evolution of Korea’s Trade and Investment Patterns     37
rapid rise in machinery imports because Korea’s own machine industry for much
of the period was not as advanced as that of its competitors.
Korea-U.S. Trade: Asymmetrical but Crucial
The trade relationship between the United States and Korea has always been
asymmetrical. The United States was and is Korea’s most important trading part-
ner (first in exports and second in imports) although Korea’s trade dependence
on the United States is lessening dramatically. In 2002 Korea’s exports to the
United States accounted for 20.2 percent of its total exports, the highest among
Korea’s trading partners; this was followed by exports to China (a 14 percent
share). Table 16 shows that in 1970, more than 30 years ago, almost two-thirds of
Korea’s total exports went to the United States. Korea’s imports from the United
States have declined over the period of 1990–2002 from a 24.3 percent share to
a 15.2 percent share of Korea’s total imports.
Naturally, Korea is not as important a trading partner for the United States as
the United States is for Korea. Nevertheless, Korea still ranks as the seventh-
largest trading partner of the United States (following Canada, Mexico, Japan,
China, Germany, and the UK) and as the seventh-largest recipient of U.S. exports
in 2002. Korea took in 3.31 percent of total U.S. exports and supplied 3.05 per-
cent of total U.S. imports (Census 2003).
The asymmetrical dependence of Korea and the United States can be mea-
sured by the ratio of bilateral trade volume to GDP in each country. The ratio is
estimated at 6.25 percent for Korea but only 0.56 percent for the United States
(Commerce 2003).
Although bilateral trade between Korea and the United States grew tremen-
dously in size, until 1981 the bilateral trade balance was persistently—with the
exception of 1978—in favor of the United States. It shifted into Korea’s favor
beginning in 1982 and has since grown significantly, reaching a peak at $8.96
billion in 2002 (Figure 12). Korea showed a trade deficit with the United States
in 1991 and 1992 and also from 1994 until 1997, but has maintained a surplus
since the economic crisis of 1997.
Korea’s 1998 recession, during which its gross domestic product shrank by
6.7 percent, led to a sharp decline in its demand for imports from all countries,
including the United States (Ahearn 1999). Conversely, Korea’s exports to the
United States rose significantly between 1998 and 2001, propelled by the strong
U.S. economy, which increased U.S. demand for foreign goods and services, and
by the depreciation of the won, which made Korean products cheaper for Ameri-
cans to buy. In 2002, the slowing U.S. economy led U.S. imports from Korea to
stagnate.
Since Korea began its outward-oriented economic development in the mid-
1960s, access to the U.S. market has been critical to Korea’s export success.
Since 1965, except for a single year—1973—the United States has been the larg-
est market for Korea’s exports.
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The dependence of Korea on the U.S. market has been more critical in some
of the leading export sectors than in others. In 2002, Korea’s three largest exports
to the United States were automobiles, radio-telephone-television equipment, and
computer equipment (Table 17). In the other direction, the largest—by far—U.S.
export to Korea was electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies (Table 18).
Korea’s Increasing Involvement with Asia
Ties among Northeast Asian countries (Japan, Korea, and China) have been evolv-
ing slowly since the 1970s; each country was busy developing its own economy,
but each began to revive contact with its neighbors in Asia.
Although North America—Canada, Mexico, and, in particular, the United
States—was the largest market outside of Asia for East Asian goods (East Asia
includes China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Japan), Asian trade with North America
is declining slowly from its peak at the end of the 1980s when the United States
absorbed 38 percent of Asian exports (Figure 13) (IMF 2003). In 2002 North
America took in about 29 percent of Northeast Asia’s exports (IMF various). One
reason for this is that intraregional trade in East Asia is expanding rapidly (Fig-
ure 14), even more rapidly than trade among NAFTA members and EU members.
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Figure 12: Korea s Imports, Exports, and Trade Balance with the 
United States, 1971 2002, billions of U.S. dollars
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Evolving Trade Patterns: Japan, China, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), and Taiwan
In trade policy, what matters most is the share of a country’s total trade with one
country or region, which measures the relative interdependence among econo-
mies. As more of the Northeast Asia region’s trade is destined for regional mar-
kets, the region’s companies and governments are more likely to invest in con-
tacts, infrastructure, and policies that support intraregional trade. Between 1985
and 2002, Korea’s exports increased more than fivefold, from $30 billion in 1985
to $161 billion in 2002. To bolster bilateral trade, starting in 1973 when Japan
accounted for about 40 percent of total Korean trade, Japan accorded Korea ben-
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Figure 13:  East Asia s Total Exports: Share of Exports to               
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efits under its generalized system of preferences (Yamazawa 2001, 12). How-
ever, Japan’s share of Korea’s trade has declined markedly since then, and, by
1991, Japan accounted for under 20 percent of Korea’s exports. In 2002 that
share fell to about 9 percent. Similarly, Japan’s share of Korea’s imports fell to
about 26 percent in 1991 and further to about 18 percent in 2002.
Much of this shift in Korea-Japan trade share represents growing trade ties
between the United States and Korea as well as the 1990s revival of Korea-China
trade, which had been in hiatus before 1987. By 2002 China accounted for 13.18
percent of Korean exports and 10.48 percent of Korean imports, and the trend
was toward further increase (Figure 15 and Figure 16).
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Figure 15: Korea s Export Links with Major Asian Countries and the 
United States, 1991 2002, percentage of Korea s total exports
Sources: IMF various; KITA various.
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Figure 16: Korea s Import Links with Major Asian Countries and the 
United States, 1991 2002, percentage of Korea s total imports
Sources: IMF various; KITA various.
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Intraregional trade is an important element in the total composition of trade
for East Asia. Petri (1993) concludes that intraregional trade has always been a
substantial part of the region’s trade composition. Intraregional trade can also be
seen as a source of steady East Asian growth throughout the 1990s despite a
worldwide recession between 1990 and 1992 (Barfield 1997). Table 19 shows
that the East Asian economies tend to depend more on intraregional trade than on
external trade (Ahn 2003, 10).
Table 19: East Asia’s Trade with the World’s Economic Regions,
1985–2000, in billions of U.S. dollars and percentages
   Region  1985                    1990                     1995                     2000
                        Value        %         Value        %        Value        %        Value        %
EU 80 11.6 220 15.4 369 14.3 421 13.4
NAFTA 196 28.5 350 24.5 552 21.4 630 20.1
East Asia 256 37.3 588 41.1 1,321 51.2 1,370 43.7
World 687 100.0 1,431 100.0 2,578 100.0 3,137 100.0
Source: Ahn 2003, 23.
The general direction of Asian economic regionalism and intraregional trade
over the preceding two decades is clear if the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis is
discounted. Newly industrializing economies (NIEs, which include Korea, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan), followed by ASEAN-4 (Thailand, Malaysia, In-
donesia, and the Philippines), China, and now Vietnam have pursued outward-
oriented economic development strategies while they stimulated inward flows of
FDI, including FDI from more industrialized Asian economies.
The increasing dependence on trade within Asia is clearly shown by the
measure of intraregional trade as a share of total trade of the region. Table 20
provides regional trade data for Japan, China, and Korea. The percentage of trade
that is regional has increased significantly for both Japan and Korea.
Korea’s exports and imports to Asian economies (including ASEAN-4, ANIEs
[the Asian newly industrializing economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan],
Japan, and China) comprised $65.4 billion (in imports) and $70.4 billion (in
exports) in 2002; this was 43.6 percent of Korea’s total imports and 43.7 percent
of its total exports (Figure 17).
Despite the growing intraregional trade and, in particular, the role of Japan
in East Asia, the United States is still the overwhelmingly dominant economy for
this region. Its importance as a market and as a source of investment continues to
be large.
Japan has traditionally been an important source of investment and technol-
ogy for Korea. Table A-2 in Appendix A shows that Korea’s dependence on Japa-
nese exports of machinery continues. During the 1991–2000 period, the six ma-
jor import groups from Japan consisted of specialized machinery for industries
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(4.8 percent in 1991; 6.8 percent in 2000), electrical machinery and apparatus
(2.4 percent in 1991 [not shown]; 4.7 percent in 2000) and telecommunications
equipment (3.3 percent in 1991; 4.1 percent in 2000).
Korea’s Investment Linkages with Japan, China, ASEAN, and Taiwan
FDI from countries outside East Asia generally outweighs investment from coun-
tries within the region. Intraregional direct investment is mainly from NIEs to
China, and investment from ASEAN-4 is increasing significantly. The increase in
intraregional direct investment from NIEs is closely associated with East Asia’s
expanded share in the global trade of IT-related goods as well as the increase in
Table 20: Total Trade and Intraregional Trade; China, Japan, and Korea;
1980, 1990, and 2000
   Trade                                      Date             China              Japan               Korea
Total trade ($ billion) 1980 38.0 271.2 39.8
1990 115.4 522.9 134.9
2000 455.4 858.8 332.8
Trade with Asia ($ billion) 1980 18.1 66.8 13.0
1990 71.5 158.7 50.4
2000 249.2 356.6 151.3
Trade with Asia as 1980 47.6 24.6 32.6
percentage of total trade 1990 61.9 30.4 37.4
2000 54.7 41.5 45.5
Source: IMF various.
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Figure 17: Trade between Korea and Asian Economies as a Percentage 
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Source: KITA various.
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intraregional trade primarily for IT-related goods. As a result, NIEs have been
relocating and expanding their production centers, particularly for IT-related
goods.
For East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, excluding Japan, the inward
FDI-GDP ratio is very high compared with that of the world as a whole (Table
21). It seems that this is the most important characteristic and that the other char-
acteristics, such as export-led growth, have been created by active inward FDI.
Like trade, investment also helps link the economies of Asia. China is the
focus of most FDI in the region. Japan and Korea host relatively small amounts
of foreign capital, although Japanese investors hold more than $5 billion in assets
in the Korean market, second only to U.S. FDI in Korea (Yamazawa 2001). As of
2000, China was host to almost $350 billion in FDI—almost 3.5 times greater
than the combined FDI in Japan and Korea (both Korea and Japan hold
multibillion-dollar stakes in the Chinese economy). Korea’s FDI inflows rose
from $200 million in 1985 to $9 billion in 2000, then dropped to $3 billion in
2001. Outward FDI accelerated during the 1990s, rising from an annual average
of less than $1 billion in the period 1988–93, to $3 billion in 1994–96, and to
$29.4 billion in 1997–2001 (UNCTAD 2002).
Assessment of China’s Special Place
With its strong growth potential, deriving from its huge population and largely
underdeveloped market, China has increasingly emerged as a major center for
trade and investment. As China has pursued market-oriented economic reform,
FDI inflows to China have increased substantially. In 2002, China received $50
Table 21: Inward FDI as Percentage of GDP, by Economy and Region; 1990,
1995, 2000
  Economy                                   1990                        1995                         2000
Korea 3.40 13.70 10.00
Japan 0.30 0.60 1.10
China 7.00 19.60 32.30
Hong Kong, China 198.10 125.00 263.80
Singapore 77.90 71.50 103.80
Taiwan 6.10 5.90 9.00
Region
South, East and 17.40 18.90 36.40
South-East Asia
ASEAN 17.30 22.89 46.55
ASEAN without
Singapore 10.57 17.49 40.19
World 8.90 10.00 20.00
Source: UNCTAD 2001.
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billion, the largest FDI inflow in the world. Large-scale investments in China
will continue as a result of political stability and more liberal FDI regulations.
China’s manufacturing sector receives 50 percent of its FDI. As a manufac-
turing center, China’s export shares in the world trade have been growing signifi-
cantly. China’s exports of manufacturing goods represented 4.7 percent of world
exports in 2000, a huge increase from 1.7 percent in 1990. China’s share of total
U.S. imports was 8.85 percent in 2002, up from 3 percent in 1991. In the same
period, China’s share of Korea’s total imports increased to 10 percent from 4
percent.
Along with its strong increase in exports, imports into China have grown
rapidly. As China’s industrialization has proceeded, China has demanded more
material and machinery to expand its production capacity. Asian Development
Bank (ADB 2002) statistics demonstrate a close relation between China’s  im-
port growth and industrialization. Throughout the 1990s, more than 70 percent of
China’s imports fell into three standard international trade classification (SITC)
categories—chemicals, basic manufactures, and machine and transport equip-
ment. China has increasingly—and particularly during the 1990s—imported what
it needs from ANIE countries; their share of China’s total imports grew to 26
percent in 2000 from 9 percent in 1991.
Although most imports have gone into China’s manufacturing sector, local
markets for consumer goods have also strengthened. China’s rapid economic
development has created local demand for imported consumer goods and has
provided more opportunities for foreign companies to profit from Chinese con-
sumers. Samsung Electronics, for example, considers China as one of its priority
markets. It sold $1.81 billion worth of consumer electronics in China in 2002 and
expects to triple these sales figures by 2005 (Roberts and Moon 2002). In par-
ticular, Samsung is promoting its high-end products, and its success shows that
growing numbers of Chinese consumers can afford and demand expensive and
sophisticated goods.
China’s WTO membership has been assessed to be beneficial for China’s
economy. While the world economy was stagnant, China Daily, in “WTO Entry
Boosts China’s Economy,” on 18 November 2002, reported that “China’s ex-
ports increased by 19.4 percent in the first three quarters of 2002” and that FDI
inflows surged. The article continued, “More than 2,300 regulations were abol-
ished under the State Council in the first half of 2002,” and stated that this gov-
ernment effort to fulfill the WTO commitment had boosted investors’ confidence
and the outlook for the Chinese market.
Positive growth will continue as long as China’s labor-intensive exports ex-
pand. In addition, a more integrated China will benefit neighboring Asian coun-
tries. China’s accession to the WTO is forecast to increase its economic output by
2.2 to 5.5 percent annually (Lardy 2002).
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Korea’s Growing Dependence on the Chinese Market
Korea is becoming increasingly dependent on the Chinese market for its exports;
Korea’s exports to China increased from 1.4 percent in 1991 to 10.7 percent in
2000. By contrast, during the same time period, Korea’s export dependence on
the United States and Japan dropped from 25.9 percent and 17.1 percent, respec-
tively, to 21.9 and 11.9 percent.
Over the years, China’s major exports to Korea have been textile materials
and products, crude oil and petroleum, corn, coal, and other raw materials. Other
bulk export commodities include chemical raw materials, rolled steel, leather
goods, shoes, fodder, and mechanical and electrical products. In recent years,
China’s sales to Korea of electronic components and other products with high
added value (i.e., telecommunications equipment) have been mounting steadily.
Chemicals, electronics, and iron and steel are China’s major imports from Korea
(see Table A-3 and Table A-4 in Appendix A).
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8. For an excellent and timely analysis of the dangers of FTAs and of a world of large trading
blocs, see Gordon 2001.
4
The Rise of Asian Regionalism in the
Context of Worldwide Trends
The formation of bilateral and regional FTAs has been a worldwide trend in re-
cent decades. Currently, more than 130 such agreements are in place (WTO 2000).
The renewed impetus for intra-Asia and Asia-U.S. FTAs, combined with the
equally strong movements centered around the EU and North and South America,
has raised again the economic and political debate over the virtues and dangers
of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements—and whether they are
building blocks or stumbling blocks to achieving global free trade. This puzzle
has no clear answer.
So-called free trade agreements short of full multilateral concessions do re-
sult in discriminations between members and nonmembers and, as economists
have frequently pointed out, produce both trade creation and trade diversion.8
Trade creation results from a lowering of barriers between the members of bilat-
eral, subregional, and regional agreements. Trade diversion occurs when exports
from efficient sectors of a country outside the agreement are diverted merely
because of lower tariff rates. This distorts international competition and may re-
duce world economic welfare. Judging such agreements from the multilateral
perspective of the WTO depends in part on whether the trade creation effects
outweigh the trade diversion effects.
Other considerations and factors also need assessment. One danger comes
from the possibility that nonmembers of FTAs may be provoked to retaliate by
raising tariff barriers or creating trade-diverting agreements with other nonmem-
bers. The key question is whether incentives to consolidate smaller FTAs into
larger FTAs and ultimately move to a global FTA are greater than counterincentives
to block new entrants or block amalgamation of FTAs such as NAFTA and the
EU-centered bilaterals. Fragmentation could very well prevail over a movement
50 Korea in Asia
toward global free trade in the foreseeable future—without some changes in the
WTO and new guidelines.
A stalemate that produces a proliferation of small FTAs with little movement
toward consolidation has a number of downsides. In the first place, it would
result in an enormously fragmented and complicated trading system—imagine a
world of dozens of FTAs, each with its own interim timetables, tariff levels, and
nontariff-barrier liberalization rules—and huge costs to multinationals such as
IBM, Siemens, or Hyundai of sorting out trade rules for each trade group. Jagdish
Bhagwati, an international trade economist, labeled this unfortunate phenomenon
the spaghetti-bowl effect (Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996).
Another problem is how to accommodate the so-called rules of origin (ROOs)
negotiated domestic content requirement of FTAs. In NAFTA, for example, 200
pages are devoted to ROOs, and this will be multiplied many times in a world of
numerous overlapping FTAs.
Finally, some critics of FTAs have predicted—and recent history has proved
them correct—that members of FTAs would discriminate against nonmembers
when imposing trade remedies such as antidumping and safeguards rules. In-
deed, in imposing the recent Section 201 steel safeguards action, the United States
loudly stated that it had excluded Canada and Mexico from high steel tariffs on
the basis of their membership in NAFTA—a policy that is contrary to the WTO
founding principle of nondiscrimination. In May 2003, a WTO panel ruled that
discrimination in favor of Canada and Mexico violated WTO rules. The United
States is appealing the ruling to the WTO Appellate Body (ITR, 8 May 2003). As
a part of the upcoming FTAA negotiations, a number of South American coun-
tries have already made it clear that exclusion from U.S. antidumping laws is a
central goal.
U.S. and Korean Responses to Bilateralism and Regionalism
For several decades after the founding of the multilateral trading system, both the
United States and Korea eschewed trade agreements outside of the GATT. Only
in the late 1980s did the United States—at the initiative of other trading part-
ners—entertain the idea of bilateral and regional trading arrangements. It first
negotiated an FTA with Canada and then went on to agree to the trilateral NAFTA
under President George H. W. Bush. It was also under the former president Bush
that the United States launched the effort to create the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) agreement. The administration of President George W. Bush
shows how U.S. trade strategy has changed. Although the first priority for trade
liberalization is still centered in WTO negotiations and the current Doha Round,
the administration of the second President Bush has announced a complementary
policy of “competitive liberalization,” under which the United States is commit-
ted to negotiating FTAs with all comers in all regions. Thus, agreements have
been signed with Jordan, Singapore, and Chile; and negotiations have begun with
Australia, Morocco, and the Central American Trade Association (Barfield 2002).
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9. Another basic approach to the empirical assessment of FTAs is the gravity model approach.
It uses a cross section of bilateral trade data and attempts to estimate a normal trade pattern.
This technique can be useful in providing information on trade effects of FTAs (this is particu-
larly the case if the cross sections are available for several time periods). Because this ap-
proach requires the application of statistical techniques to existing data, it is usually used after
agreements are put in place, when it can confirm the presence of trade creation and/or diversion.
Like the United States, Korea long avoided agreements beyond the GATT
and the WTO, but Korea’s position changed dramatically at the end of the 1990s.
Motivating factors for Korea’s decision to pursue the establishment of FTAs were
not only the fear of being left out of the recent trend of growing regionalism but
also the onset of the Asian financial crisis. Some Korean policymakers believed
that the current account deficit that preceded the financial crisis made painfully
clear the danger of failing to secure stable access to foreign trade and financial
markets.
The Korean government is currently pursuing FTAs with smaller strategic
countries as a precursor to establishing trade agreements with its larger trade
partners. Korea chose Chile as its first FTA candidate, but Korean officials are
also studying the pros and cons of a number of other FTAs, including agreements
with Japan, ASEAN, China, Mexico, and others.
The increased interest in FTAs raises the important question of whether these
more limited, often regionally or bilaterally based trading agreements are benefi-
cial to the participating economies. As FTAs become a more commonly consid-
ered policy option, it is increasingly important to evaluate how the economic
effects of FTAs compare with the effects of broader multilateral trading arrange-
ments as well as how the FTAs affect world trade flows in general.
For situations in which analysis is required prior to the fact—when a deci-
sion to establish an FTA needs to be made, for example—the most common tech-
nique in recent years has been simulation with a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model.9 This model takes cross-sectoral data from a single base period,
not only for trade but also for production and consumption, and imposes a de-
tailed theoretical structure on the interactions among different data elements. These
models take the form of equilibrium constraints and assumptions on economic
behavior. The models are put to use by changing the underlying data (in the case
of FTAs, removing tariffs between member economies) and observing how the
remaining variables adjust.
Proposed Bilateral FTAs for Korea
Japan and the United States are two countries that are important to Korea’s exter-
nal trade. What would be the effect of a bilateral FTA with each?
The Potential of a Korea-Japan FTA
The proposal for a bilateral agreement between Korea and Japan has been dis-
cussed between the governments of the two countries and has attracted consider-
able interest from some affected domestic interest groups.
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The most sensitive issues appear to stem from lingering political resentment
over imperial excesses during the period when Korea was subject to Japan’s con-
trol before 1945. The proposal has also been reviewed exhaustively by academic
and government economists: five recent studies—a pair of studies (Sohn 2000;
McKibbin et al. 2002) by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
(KIEP) and single studies by the Institute of Developing Economies, Brown et
al., and the Institute for International Economics (IIE)—have estimated the po-
tential effect of a Korea-Japan FTA on welfare, trade, and productivity. All stud-
ies use CGE models to analyze the proposed agreement; some use static CGE
models and some use dynamic CGE models. KIEP’s second model (McKibbin et
al. 2002) aims to rectify problems found in other studies.
Static Models
The findings of the static models (Sohn 2000, Choi and Schott 2001, Brown et al.
2001, and IDE 2000) are summarized in Table 22. The most striking results of
these simulations are that Korea’s GDP and trade balance with Japan would be
reduced. Sohn predicts that Korea’s GDP level will decrease by 0.07 percent,
Choi and Schott predict a 0.28 percent decrease, and Brown et al. predict a 0.23
percent decrease. Sohn predicts that Korea’s trade balance with Japan will de-
cline by $60.9 million. The study by Choi and Schott concludes that Korea’s
bilateral trade balance with Japan would deteriorate.
It is well known that some Korean industries and farmers oppose a prospec-
tive Korea-Japan FTA precisely because it would exacerbate their bilateral trade
deficit with Japan (Choi and Schott 2001; Yamazawa 2001). Japan would reap
small welfare gains resulting from a small increase in its global exports and im-
ports. Estimates of gains to Japan’s GDP range from an increase of 0.01 percent
to 0.18 percent. These static estimates do not indicate that there is a great deal of
benefit to a bilateral FTA between Japan and Korea.
Japan’s IDE report (2000) contradicts the findings of the other three static
studies in the sense that it estimates that Korea’s GDP would rise by 0.06 percent,
a result that can be attributed to a difference in model structures, simulation meth-
ods, levels of shock of trade liberalization, and selection of data.
Dynamic Models
With the introduction of dynamic effects,10 Sohn (2000) and IDE (2000) models
show larger effects of the proposed FTA on Korea’s economy (Table 23). In real
GDP, for example, IDE reports a large increase, 10.4 percent in Japan and 8.7
percent in Korea, and Sohn shows a 2.9 percent increase in Korea. Cheong (2002,
10. In dynamic models, firms of each area studied are assumed to exhibit intertemporal optimi-
zation behavior; that is, besides employing labor, capital, and land as well as intermediates to
conduct production, firms also make investment decisions to maximize their intertemporal
profits. Thus capital accumulates endogenously over time.
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25) notes, “[T]hese estimates are very hypothetical and, therefore, criticized be-
cause the assumptions of the large change of TFP (total factor productivity) growth
are purely exogenously given.”
In the analysis of dynamic effects, Sohn (2000) assumes a 10 percent in-
crease in productivity—an annual 1 percent increase during a 10-year period—
for heavy and chemical industries in Korea. IDE (2000) assumes a 30 percent
Table 22: Economic Impact of a Korea-Japan FTA, CGE static models
                                                        KIEP              IIE          Brown et al.         IDE
Results          (2000)           (2001)           (2001)             (2000)
    GTAP parameters (static)
Korea Welfare level (%) –0.19 — — 0.34
GDP (%) –0.07 –0.28 –0.23 0.06
Trade balance with –60.90 — — –38.85
Japan ($ million)
Total trade balance –15.43 — — –2.70
Japan Welfare level (%) 0.14 — — 0.03
GDP (%) 0.04 0.01 0.18 0.00
Trade balance with 60.90 — — 38.85
Korea ($ million)
Total trade balance — — — 54.79
Note: The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is a multiregion, multisector, comput-
able general equilibrium model, with perfect competition and constant returns to scale;
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/default.asp.
Table 23: Economic Impact of a Korea-Japan FTA, CGE dynamic models
Results                                                     KIEP (2000)             IDE (2000)
                                                                               GTAP parameters    (dynamic)
Korea Welfare level (%) 11.43 7.09
GDP (%) 2.88 8.67
Trade balance with Japan ($ million) –4.4 –24.60
Total trade balance 30.14 408.00
Japan Welfare level (%) — 9.29
GDP (%) — 10.44
Trade balance with Korea ($ million) — 24.60
Total trade balance — 182.00
Note: The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is a multiregion, multisector, comput-
able general equilibrium model, with perfect competition and constant returns to scale;
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/default.asp.
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increase of productivity, at an annual rate of 3 percent during a 10-year period,
for metal products, transportation equipment, electronic equipment, and other
machinery and equipment industries. IDE also predicts a 10 percent annual in-
crease for textiles and wearing apparel, other manufactures, and services indus-
tries for both countries.
Recent research by Cheong (2002) improved Sohn’s estimation method by
incorporating the effects of capital accumulation into a standard CGE model in-
stead of specifying TFP growth exogenously.
KIEP’s New Model
The result of a new KIEP study carried out in 2001 (McKibbin et al. 2002) is
significantly different from those reported in previous studies (Table 24). This
study used a new model with economies of scale, capital accumulation effects,
and Korean parameters. The differences in the model (compared with the 2000
model) make a significant impact on the estimated effects of a bilateral FTA
between Korea and Japan. In addition to having other extensive effects, Korea’s
GDP is predicted to rise by 0.22 to 0.33 percent in the short term and by 0.82 to
1.90 percent in the midterm to long term.
The Problem of Agriculture
The intense political opposition in both Japan and Korea to liberalization of ag-
riculture makes it conceivable that a Korea-Japan FTA would seek to exclude
Table 24: Economic Impact of a Korea-Japan FTA, the 2001 KIEP Model
  Results                     GTAP parameters                          GTAP + Korea parameters
              CRS             Economies of scale               CRS            Economies of scale
   Short      Mid to      Short       Mid to       Short     Mid to      Short      Mid to
                     term    long term   term      long term     term    long term   term      long term
Real
GDP 0.22 0.82 0.30 1.90 0.21 0.96 0.33 1.79
Price
level 0.37 –0.31 0.23 –0.46 0.48 –0.19 0.31 –0.26
Welfare
level 0.28 0.44 0.33 1.31 0.30 0.66 0.38 1.39
Savings 0.68 3.06 0.60 7.91 0.77 2.84 0.71 5.05
Capital
volume 0.13 1.38 0.12 2.50 0.13 1.76 0.13 2.52
Terms of
trade 0.03 –0.46 –0.01 –0.76 0.13 –0.35 0.09 –0.49
Trade
balance –1.0 2.3 –1.0 6.4 –1.1 1.6 –1.1 3.4
Source: McKibbin et al. 2002, 48.
Note: The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is a multiregion, multisector, comput-
able general equilibrium model, with perfect competition and constant returns to scale;
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/default.asp.
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important segments of bilateral farm trade (as in the EU-Mexico FTA, the Japan-
Singapore FTA, and, to a lesser extent, the Canada-U.S. FTA). However, exclud-
ing agriculture could run counter to Korea’s and Japan’s WTO obligations be-
cause regional trade agreements are permitted under the WTO only if (among
other conditions) they include “substantially all trade.”
In view of concerns that have been expressed over the possible exclusion of
agriculture from a Japan-Korea FTA, the proposed FTA between the two coun-
tries is simulated in the static IIE study (Choi and Schott 2001) both with and
without the agriculture sector. The exclusion of agriculture yields an unambigu-
ous improvement in the welfare outcome for Korea. This suggests that the inclu-
sion of agriculture in any Japan-Korea FTA would result in significant trade di-
version, primarily in the form of increased South Korean agricultural exports to
Japan (Choi and Schott 2001, 119). The removal of agriculture from the agree-
ment eliminates this trade diversion. For a breakdown of recent trade between
Korea and Japan, see Table A-1 and Table A-2 in Appendix A.
The Impact of a Korea-U.S. FTA
In 2001, both the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC 2001) and the
Institute for International Economics (Choi and Schott 2001) investigated the
economic effects of a proposed Korea-U.S. bilateral free trade treaty. In addition,
several studies of the welfare effects of a variety of subregional, regional, and
cross-regional trading arrangements have looked at the impact on the U.S. and
Korean economies of broader trade liberalization initiatives, up to APEC-wide
negotiations.
On the basis of CGE modeling results, the USITC projected that four years
after the implementation of a U.S.-Korea FTA, U.S. GDP would increase 0.2
percent over baseline growth, while Korean GDP would add 0.7 percent to cur-
rent baseline growth. On the basis of somewhat different assumptions, Choi and
Schott (2001) found a wider band of potential welfare effects for Korea, ranging
from 0.4 percent to 2.0 percent. This small but positive effect for both countries
should be placed in perspective, particularly for the United States, where total
trade as a share of GDP was about 26 percent in 2000 and U.S.-Korea trade
represents less than 3 percent of total U.S. trade. Thus, for all of these simula-
tions, the impact on the U.S. economy would range from small to miniscule.
The USITC (2001) found that, after four years, total U.S. exports and im-
ports would be approximately 0.8 percent and 1.0 percent higher, respectively,
than if the FTA had not been implemented. For Korea, the FTA would result in an
increase in total worldwide exports of 3.5 percent relative to the baseline, while
total imports would increase by 6.2 percent. Bilaterally, the effects on exports
and imports in each country would be more noticeable. The existence of an FTA
would cause U.S. exports to Korea to be 54 percent higher than if there were no
FTA (Figure 18); and Korea’s exports to the United States are projected to be 21
percent higher (Figure 19).
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At the Sectoral Level
The estimated effects on trade are quite large for both Korea and the United
States in those sectors where trade barriers are currently high. Thus, the largest
gains for the United States will be in agriculture and manufacturing. At a more
detailed commodity level, U.S. exports of beef and cheese could possibly rise by
60 percent, and exports of beer could increase approximately 100 percent. U.S.
exports of all manufacturing products to Korea would rise by about $8 billion,
while exports of agricultural products would rise by about $10 billion.
Conversely, Korea’s exports to the United States would also rise steeply in
sectors, such as textiles, where U.S. barriers are excessive—with textile and ap-
parel products rising by $7 billion and other manufacturing products by $2.9
billion (see Table 25 and Table 26).
 
Figure 18: U.S. Exports to Korea with and without an FTA, 1995=100
Source: USITC 2001, 5-5.
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Source: USITC 2001, 5-5.
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Table 25: Effects of U.S.-Korea FTA on Selected U.S. Imports, 2005 (est.)
relative to baseline (1995)
   Commodity                                  Korea          World            Korea            World
                                                       %                      millions of 1995 dollars
Rice 1.72 1.13 —b 4
Meat products 14.04 0.87 —b 31
Fruits and vegetables 1.55 1.10 —b 56
Dairy products 550.35 1.39 15 28
Rest of agriculture 31.73 1.17 178 1,229
Natural (extractive) resources 0.56 —a 1 252
Textiles and apparel 125.19 3.37 7,008 3,150
Mineral and metal products 14.45 0.76 383 808
Other manufacturing 8.30 0.87 2,887 5,860
Services –4.95 0.61 –209 1,094
Total 21.40 0.98 10,262 12,512
Sources: GTAP 2002; USITC 2001. a Less than 0.5 percent; b Less than $500,000
Table 26: Effects of U.S.-Korea FTA on Selected U.S. Exports, 2005 (est.)
relative to baseline (1995)
   Commodity                                  Korea            World           Korea         World
                                                      %                       millions of 1995 dollars
Rice 1,026.93 –1.47 —b –14
Meat products 120.70 7.12 716 602
Fruits and vegetables 108.73 —a 69 –26
Dairy products 954.62 15.46 207 190
Rest of agriculture 216.00 9.27 9,432 8,084
Natural (extractive) resources 17.61 –1.00 91 –20
Textiles and apparel 49.19 –1.13 163 –196
Mineral and metal products 21.39 —a 396 –236
Other manufacturing 37.40 —a 8,021 1,109
Services 1.26 –1.07 8 –2,098
Total 53.95 0.84 19,175 7,396
Sources: GTAP 2002; USITC 2001. a Less than 0.5 percent; b Less than $500,000
Domestic Production
Changes in trade flows affect both sectoral and overall production in national
economies. In most cases, an increase in exports provides the incentive to in-
crease the output of a particular sector, while increased competition and imports
usually result in a decrease in domestic production, at least in the short term. As
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increases and decreases in incentives operate across a number of sectors, produc-
tive resources are reallocated, and cross-sectoral demand for different factors of
production is altered. Because the supply of the factors of production is con-
strained at any given time, expansion of some sectors will be accompanied by
contraction in other sectors.
For the United States, these induced production changes are quite small,
given that U.S. trade with Korea is quite small in relation to total U.S. trade and
production. The largest increase—just under 1 percent—would come in the com-
bined agricultural sectors. The largest decrease would occur in the textiles and
apparel industries, with output declining by 1.3 percent (Table 27). The decrease
results from both a sharp increase in textile and apparel imports from Korea and
the expansion of resources in U.S. agriculture, which squeezes factors of produc-
tion out of textiles and apparel.
For Korea, the reverse would occur: production in textiles and apparel would
increase by 18.2 percent, while production would decrease in other sectors be-
cause of both an increase in U.S. imports and the squeeze on factors of produc-
tion. Specifically, the USITC (2001) estimates that after four years, total Korean
agricultural production would be 5.5 percent lower as a result of U.S. imports
and a booming textile and apparel sector. Also, trade diversion and the loss of
market access would cause other regions to suffer small welfare losses as a result
of the U.S.-Korea bilateral FTA: GDP in the EU would drop 0.1 percent against
the baseline, and GDP for the rest of East Asia would drop by 0.16 against the
baseline.
Table 27: Effects of U.S.-Korea FTA on Korea and on the World,
  2005 (est.) relative to baseline (1995)
   Commodity                                  Korea          World             Korea           World
                                                      %                       millions of 1995 dollars
Rice —a –0.82 4 –300
Meat products 0.72 –2.97 1,006 –24
Fruits and vegetables —a –0.78 99 –136
Dairy products 0.54 –2.32 641 –137
Rest of agriculture 0.98 –8.44 13,636 –8,222
Natural (extractive) resources —a —a –39 –85
Textiles and apparel –1.30 18.19 –3,678 12,525
Mineral and metal products —a –0.95 –108 –1,217
Other manufacturing —a —a 584 –1,519
Services —a 1.41 22,857 7,352
Sources: GTAP 2002; USITC 2001.
a Less than 0.5 percent
Prospects for Future U.S.-Korea Trade and Investment Relations     59
5
Prospects for Future U.S.-Korea Trade
and Investment Relations
This final chapter describes the issues facing the United States and Korea in three
venues—the multilateral, the regional, and the bilateral. Specifically, the study
addresses common and competing goals for the two countries in the Doha Round
of WTO negotiations, the challenges and potential responses to growing regional
arrangements in Asia, and, finally, bilateral trade and investment issues. Where
appropriate, recommendations are advanced to the governments of both coun-
tries.
Common and Competing Goals in WTO Doha Round
The launching of the Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations in
November 2001 presented new challenges for U.S.-Korea trade relations. Among
the goals set forth in the Doha Declaration are new or amended negotiated agree-
ments on industrial tariffs, services, intellectual property, agriculture, subsidies,
government procurement, tariff peaks in textiles, and other areas. In addition,
there are the so-called Singapore issues that were agreed at the 1996 ministerial
meeting in Singapore. These included working parties on investment and the
environment, transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, and
trade and development. This study will not attempt to analyze all of these issues;
it will merely highlight some of the most important in relation to the United States
and Korea.
Recent economic studies with the CGE model have evaluated how the Doha
Round will affect the Korean economy. One study (Choi and Park 2002) simu-
lated eight separate policy scenarios ranging from virtually full liberalization in
all manufacturing, agricultural, and services sectors back through various partial
liberalizations (25 percent, 50 percent, etc.). Results showed that real GDP and
welfare for Korea would increase, respectively, by 2.55–4.21 percent and 3.06–
4.62 percent under the various scenarios calculated. Similar studies for the U.S.
economy demonstrate positive welfare effects of 1.59 percent (the scenario as-
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sumes a 33 percent reduction in all trade barriers, including reduction in agricul-
tural protection, tariffs on manufactures, and services barriers (Brown et al. 2002,
table 4).
U.S. and Korean Goals at Doha
Both the United States and Korea go into the Doha Round with a set of liberaliza-
tion goals, some of which are quite similar and some of which are at odds with
those of the other trading partner. In general, the United States and Korea are
likely to team up on industrial tariff reduction (although there will be separate
priorities and modalities for proceeding) and on services liberalization (although
again with different priorities and with different sensitive sectors). The major
conflicts will come in reform of agriculture and reform of WTO antidumping
rules.
In December 2002, the United States formally proposed a bold and sweep-
ing reduction of all industrial tariff rates among WTO nations by 2015 (USTR
2002e). Under the U.S. proposal, during phase one (2005–10), all duties now set
below 5 percent would be eliminated. The effect of this proposal would be to
make more than three-quarters of imports into the United States, the EU, and
Japan duty free by 2010. The United States also proposed a separate initiative for
“highly traded goods” under which zero-for-zero negotiations would be under-
taken with the goal also of eliminating all tariffs by 2010. Among the sectors
suggested for inclusion in these negotiations were agricultural equipment, con-
struction equipment, chemicals and allied products, information technology and
electronic products, pharmaceuticals, steel, toys, medical equipment, and wood
products. Finally, the U.S. proposal would “harmonize” all high-tariff products
(particularly textiles and apparel) at 8 percent by 2010, and then eliminate all
tariffs in these sectors by 2015.
Korea will probably welcome much of the U.S. proposal. For example, al-
though it asks for deep and quick tariff reductions, the U.S. proposal largely
follows a formula approach (labeled the Swiss formula in WTO terms) as op-
posed to an across-the-board or request–offer approach (Choi et al. 2002). For
only a select group of sectors does it suggest a zero-for-zero approach. In addi-
tion, one of Korea’s announced goals for the Doha Round is a sharp reduction in
high and peak tariffs (Choi et al. 2002, 127–8). Undoubtedly, however, there are
some industrial sectors (such as chemicals and automobiles) where political sen-
sitivities will present problems. On balance, though, the United States and Korea
will generally be working from a common framework in this area.
For services, the United States has made liberalization in individual sectors
its chief negotiating goal. In a July 2002 announcement (USTR 2002d), the USTR
targeted some 15 sectors including telecommunications, financial services, ex-
press delivery, energy and environmental services, education, professional ser-
vices, distribution services, advertising, and audiovisual services. In addition,
the United States urged as a general priority a sizable increase in sectoral com-
mitments to commercial presence (investment) and to temporary entry for pro-
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fessional services workers (Yerkey and Pruzin 2002). For its part, Korea has
submitted request–offer communications to some 36 WTO members, mainly in
the areas of telecommunications, construction, distribution, financial services,
and maritime services (Choi et al. 2002, 77–8). In the financial-services area,
Korea has an advantage over many other developing countries in that as a result
of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 it initiated a number of financial-services
regulatory reforms on its own or as a result of negotiations with the IMF (Choi et
al. 2002, 100).
For the United States, maritime services will present the most difficult nego-
tiating issue, not only with Korea but also with many other WTO members. There
will almost certainly be a strong attack on U.S. protection in this area, with many
members balking at opening other services areas without some movement in
maritime services on the part of the United States. Korea, on the other hand, is
likely to find strong pressure to liberalize its relatively closed legal, education,
medical, and health services sectors (Choi et al. 2002, 77–8).
Agricultural negotiations will present the greatest challenges in the overall
Doha Round negotiations and for the prospects of reaching accommodation be-
tween the United States and Korea. Korea will join Europe and Japan in resisting
major changes, while the United States will take a leadership role, along with the
Cairns Group11 of agricultural nations and many developing countries, in pushing
for sweeping reforms (Choi et al. 2002, 65–7).
The United States has already attempted to preempt the opposition by set-
ting high goals for reform of WTO rules on agricultural supports. In July 2002,
the USTR unveiled an ambitious proposal to cut farm subsidies in the WTO trade
talks (USTR 2002c). Under the U.S. proposal, WTO members would be required
to eliminate all agricultural export subsidies over a five-year period after the
negotiations conclude in 2005. Further, the United States wants a reduction in
average global import tariffs on farm products from about 62 percent in 2003 to
15 percent over the same five-year period. Finally, the U.S. proposal would re-
duce trade-distorting government subsidies for agriculture by more than $100
billion by restricting subsidies to 5 percent of the total of domestic agricultural
production.
Because it does not export large quantities of farm products, Korea will not
be affected by the proposals of the United States and others such as the Cairns
Group for drastic reductions in export subsidies (Choi et al. 2002, 71). Korea
will, however, be subject to major adjustment challenges if agreements are reached
in the Doha Round for big reductions in tariffs and trade-distorting internal sub-
sidies. Important areas will be dairy goods (applied tariffs are just under 40 per-
cent), beef (tariffs are in the 30–70 percent range), fruit, vegetables, beverages,
and juices (many tariffs are in the area of 50 percent), and prepared foods such as
11. Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uru-
guay are members of the Cairns Group.
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peanut butter, soups, jams, and jellies (the tariff range is 30–50 percent). Finally,
in a class by itself is the problem of rice; strict Korean quotas limit rice imports
severely.
Korea, along with Japan and the EU, has already attacked the U.S. proposal
as going beyond the mandate given for the trade talks at Doha (Bridges 2002).
These are just the opening gambits in a negotiating struggle that will be decided
at the very last moments of the Doha Round.
Another difficult negotiation—the results will once again be known only at
the very end of the round—is on reform of WTO antidumping rules. On anti-
dumping reform, the United States (and the EU to some extent) will find itself
isolated from almost all other members of the WTO. In the run-up to Doha, in
controversy over the goals and framework of future negotiations, skirmishing
over antidumping reform began even before the round was launched. In a last-
minute compromise that papered over deep differences, the Doha Declaration
provides for negotiations “aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines” under
the WTO’s existing antidumping and subsidies agreements, but the mandate also
states that such negotiations will preserve the “basic concepts, principles and
effectiveness of these Agreements and their instruments and objectives.” (WTO
2001a).
Korea, along with other vociferous demandeurs for reform, has joined a
group called Friends of Antidumping (Choi et al. 2002, 142–4). In June and Oc-
tober of 2002, the group put forward a substantial, specific list of changes to
existing rules, including the elimination of the practice of zeroing-out export
prices that are above the average of the home market; rewriting and tightening
the instructions regarding how costs of production are calculated; similarly tight-
ening the criteria for determining whether an industry in the importing country
has been materially injured; mandating that antidumping duties be set only high
enough to repair the alleged injury, and not higher; and, finally, introducing a
public-interest test to all national antidumping regimes that would take into ac-
count the costs of dumping duties to downstream industries and ultimate con-
sumers.
In December 2002, the United States signaled its strong opposition to many
of the proposals put forward by the Friends of Antidumping, arguing that the
proposals violate the Doha Declaration and do not preserve the “basic concepts,
principles and effectiveness” of the antidumping agreement. The issue is now
fully joined, and a game of chicken is likely to be played out over the next two
years. Many developing countries have adamantly stated that they will not sign
off on other trade liberalization agreements in the Doha Round unless major re-
forms of the antidumping agreement are enacted. The Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR), on the other hand, is under a strong mandate from
the U.S. Congress to hold the line. Thus, this issue, along with agricultural reform
proposals, will almost certainly be decided as a part of some kind of grand bar-
gain in the final days of the Doha Round negotiations.
On the Singapore issues—transparency in government procurement, trade
facilitation, investment, and competition policy—the United States and Korea
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will more often find common cause than disagreement, particularly on the less
controversial issues of trade facilitation and government procurement. In gen-
eral, it is the EU that is pressing for inclusion of investment and competition
policy in the negotiations.
The United States has no strong negotiating goal regarding competition policy,
not least because of continuing divisions among U.S. government agencies. It is
interesting that Korea is taking the lead in pushing for some kind multilateral
framework for competition policy, in contrast with the opposition of most devel-
oping countries, particularly countries in Asia (Choi et al. 2002, 249–51). Nei-
ther the United States nor Korea will be among the WTO members pushing for
significant new WTO rules and regulations on investment although the United
States may play to the galleries by offering itself as a mediating force between the
EU and developing countries.
On another new issue, trade and the environment, the most likely outcome is
for an agreement to continue studying the relation between multilateral environ-
ment agreements (MEAs) and WTO rules. Developing countries, however, will
oppose negotiating fixed rules governing these relations during this round. The
Korean government, at least rhetorically, has pledged to take an active part in any
environmental negotiations.
U.S.-Korea WTO Trade Dispute Cases
The United States and Korea have increasingly turned to the new WTO dispute
settlement system for independent judgments on trade disputes (See Table B-1 in
Appendix B for details of each case). Since the creation of the WTO in 1995,
U.S.-Korea trade disputes have resulted in twelve WTO dispute settlement cases
that have affected a small but important share of the U.S.-Korea trade flows.
Choi and Schott (2001) state that U.S.-Korea WTO dispute settlement cases filed
before 2001 (the first 10 cases) involved almost $2.5 billion of U.S. exports to
Korea and about $1.9 billion of Korea’s exports to the United States in 1999.
This was about 8 percent of total U.S.-Korea merchandise trade volume.
Although the two countries have initiated an equal number of cases against
each other, a pronounced difference exists between the products and protection
instruments involved in the cases of each country. WTO dispute settlement cases
filed by Korea came in reaction to the U.S. antidumping and safeguards regime.
Three out of the six Korean cases addressed U.S. antidumping measures against
Korea’s exports of electronic products (color television receivers, July 1997),
semiconductors (DRAMs of 1 megabyte and above, August 1997), and steel prod-
ucts (steel plate, sheet and strip, August 1999). Two more cases addressed U.S.
safeguards actions against steel products (steel line pipe, June 2000; and a wide
range steel of products, March 2002). One separate case reflected complaints
against the U.S. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Act of 2000 (the Byrd Amend-
ment, January 2001) (WTO 2002).
Cases brought by the United States were concerned mostly with Korea’s
regulatory systems such as distribution provisions, certification and test stan-
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dards, tariffs, and government procurement practices. Five cases out of the six
filed by the United States against Korea were related to agricultural and food
products: testing and inspection of agricultural products (April 1995), the shelf
life of products (May 1995), inspection of agricultural products (May 1996),
taxes on alcoholic beverages (May 1997), and imports of fresh, chilled, and fro-
zen beef (February 1999). Another case addressed government procurement is-
sues (February 1999).
The WTO dispute settlement cases between the United States and Korea
clearly reveal the diverse nature of trade policies implemented by the two coun-
tries with respect to both the domestic sectors for which they seek protection and
the trade protection instruments they use. Differences in their protected sectors
and in their use of trade instruments are likely to create divergent priorities for
the two countries during further bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations and
are hallmarks of the greatest challenges facing negotiators from the two coun-
tries.
The Rise of Asian Regional Agreements: U.S. and Korean
Perspectives
The sudden increase in the number of negotiated and proposed regional and sub-
regional trade agreements over the past few years has taken both trade officials
and scholars by surprise. Although trade economists have long studied the poten-
tial effects of various FTAs around the world, recent events and proposals have
spawned a veritable cottage industry of studies by academics and national de-
partments of trade. Economic effects constitute one important basis for judging
the pros and cons of individual new trade agreements, but also to be factored in
are a number of geopolitical factors—security, diplomatic, and political goals
and realities.
Costs and benefits of new trade agreements by Asian countries—whether
with one another or with other trading partners—will likely depend as much on
geopolitical factors as economic consequences. This is particularly true with re-
gard to the United States and South Korea because the exigencies created by the
Cold War and a divided Korean peninsula (never more intrusive than at present)
created a relationship in which political and security issues are inextricably en-
twined with economic issues.
Chapter 4 provided a discussion of the economic effects of two bilateral
FTAs that have been much discussed: a Korea-Japan FTA and a Korea-U.S. FTA.
Selected larger subregional trade arrangements would have other economic ef-
fects and impacts on the U.S. and Korean economies as well as noneconomic
consequences. To simplify this analysis, the results of one set of simulations
(Scollay and Gilbert 2001) will form the basis for judgment.
The specific results used in Table 28 are the net economic welfare effects
and the terms of trade (changes in exports and imports) effects. Scollay and Gil-
bert (2001) used a static model that captures only short-term effects, but not
dynamic, longer-term effects such as the exploitation of economies of scale and
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the impact over time of positive changes in investment and productivity. Their
model is therefore likely to be at the lower bound of positive effects. These re-
sults are not, of course, exact and should be taken as giving the range and direc-
tion of change. In many circumstances, CGE models such as these have produced
conflicting results, but simulations of liberalization by various APEC countries
have shown a broad consistency among earlier and current studies.
For Korea, from a purely welfare gain–loss perspective, the larger Asian
FTAs yield the most positive results:
• An APEC preferential liberalization under which APEC members
remove tariffs against each other but not against nonmembers would
boost Korea’s economy by an additional 1.63 percent of GDP;
• A western Pacific (AFTA12-CER13-Japan-Korea-China) FTA would
boost Korea’s GDP by 1.20 percent;
• An AFTA-Japan-Korea-China (East Asia) FTA would add 1.18
percent;
• An APEC most-favored-nation (MFN) liberalization under which
APEC members remove tariffs against each other and against non-
members would add 0.94 percent of GDP to Korea’s economy;
• An APEC FTA, excluding the United States, would boost Korea’s
economy by 0.94 percent; and
• An APEC FTA, excluding Japan, would boost it by 0.93 percent.
The Scollay-Gilbert model indicates that potential bilateral FTAs with Japan
have a negative effect on Korea’s GDP: –15.0 percent with agriculture excluded;
–0.28 percent with agriculture included.
For the United States, the picture is more complicated; several explanatory
points need to be made before tracking the impact of individual FTAs on U.S.
GDP. First, in most cases the impact is miniscule, and, given the imprecision of
CGE model results, the best interpretation would be that these FTAs would have
practically no positive or negative impact on U.S. GDP. Second, given the size of
the U.S. economy, it may well be (though this is not inevitable) that the future
dynamic effects (economies of scale, productivity enhancement) of trade liberal-
ization that are not captured would produce much more positive results. Third,
given the relative openness of the U.S. market in manufacturing and agriculture,
the real welfare gains from future liberalization may come in the services sectors,
where current models are inadequate and may well understate future positive
benefits.
In general, however, progressively more comprehensive East Asian–western
Pacific trade blocs that exclude the United States result in progressively greater
welfare losses for the United States. Thus, the United States would be negatively
12. ASEAN free trade area.
13. Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) Trade Agreement.
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impacted most by a western Pacific FTA (–.06 percent of GDP); followed by a
Japan-Korea-CER-AFTA (South Asia, plus Japan and Korea) FTA at –0.015 per-
cent and an East Asia FTA (Japan-Korea-China-AFTA) at –0.013 percent. On the
other hand, various APEC-based liberalizations generally yield small but posi-
tive welfare gains for the United States.
For many of the proposed or consummated Asian FTAs, trade diversion from
countries excluded from each particular pact is pervasive though often small. For
Korea, particularly, the impact of trade diversion from U.S. companies will present
an important calculation and problem. For the United States, although the amount
of diversion may be small in terms of GDP, for the affected industries and sectors
the impact might provoke substantial constituent opposition and pressure from
the U.S. Congress.
In the end, geopolitical factors in both the United States and Korea will play
significant roles, especially given recent events and trends in Asia. For example,
China in the past several years has begun to move decisively toward a leadership
role in trade with Southeast Asia, as evidenced by its persistent wooing of the
nations of ASEAN for an FTA. Japan has signaled a redirection of its trade policy
toward more intra-Asian trade agreements; however, unlike China and possibly
because of a general stasis in Japanese internal politics, Japan has largely failed
to carry through its new goals. Korea must decide whether it really wants to
pursue bilateral or trilateral trade arrangements (Korea-Japan, Korea-China, or
Korea-China-Japan) that will quite possibly lead to greater political involvement
with these two powers and less with the United States. Would a move toward
integrating with United States and Latin America make more sense for Korea
from both an economic and a political standpoint?
While the United States is much the larger economic and political power—
indeed, the only superpower—it, too, faces real challenges in responding to the
rapidly evolving patterns of Asian regionalism. Both economics and geopolitics
dictate that the United States cannot afford to be left out of these Asian trends; yet
little thought seems to have gone into the specifics of a U.S.-Asia regional policy.
USTR has trumpeted “competitive liberalization” and has announced its intent to
negotiate FTAs with many and sundry nations—Chile, Singapore, Jordan, Mo-
rocco, Australia, and Central America—but neither U.S. Trade Representative
Zoellick nor any other U.S. official has provided any sense of priority or order to
this process.
Optimal Choices for the United States and Korea
The best option for both the United States and Korea is to take a leadership role
and summon the political courage to make the necessary compromises to achieve
a successful outcome to the WTO Doha Round (Gordon 2003). A proliferation of
numerous bilateral or trilateral FTAs would be the most negative outcome among
the choices of various Asian regional pacts. For small-scale FTAs, in almost all
cases the economic welfare of the participants is little enhanced; more important,
each such arrangement would increase the level and complexity of trade diver-
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sion and create a bewildering set of new trade rules and rules of origin—Bhagwati
and Panagariya’s spaghetti-bowl effect. A plethora of small FTAs would also
most likely lead to greater trade tension and conflicts. Finally, the attention and
resources that would need to be devoted to these small FTAs would divert human
resources and political capital from the attainment of larger trade and investment
goals.
Thus, as the economic studies cited above amply demonstrate, the first and
best regional options revolve around APEC. For both the region as a whole and
for individual nations, APEC-wide liberalization yields the most significant eco-
nomic welfare gains. Politically, negotiations within the APEC framework get
around the problem of integrating Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China into a trade
framework. And both Australia and New Zealand, which are often left out of
subregional FTA proposals, could be included.
The largest challenge to APEC today is the modality that hitherto has gov-
erned the negotiating process. So-called concerted unilateralism, by which each
APEC nation liberalizes unilaterally and no reciprocal rules are applied, has not
to date produced meaningful results; and APEC liberalization seems to have stalled.
The United States and Korea—and, most significantly, Japan and China, as the
other major forces behind APEC liberalization—face crucial choices in the im-
mediate future. One path, which seems increasingly unlikely, is to reinvigorate
concerted unilateralism. The other is to explore the possibility of adopting a more
traditional modality: that is, converting APEC into a reciprocity-based and bind-
ing FTA.
Economic simulations show that, whatever the means to get there, an APEC
preferential agreement does result in the greatest welfare gains for APEC mem-
bers, both large and small; however, the problems inherent in this approach are
enormous. Would Japan and Korea, for instance, agree to binding rules for agri-
culture? Would the United States make unacceptable demands regarding labor
and the environment? In addition, an APEC-wide FTA would have the strongest
negative impacts on other regions such as Europe and Latin America in the mul-
tilateral trading system. This could increase trade friction and conflict; or, con-
versely, it could spur these regions to take the lead in greater MFN liberalization
through the WTO.
Two other obvious potential configurations in Asia are a western Pacific
FTA or an East Asian FTA. A western Pacific trade bloc, joining Northeast Asia,
Southeast Asia, and Australia–New Zealand would also generate substantial wel-
fare gains for participants; but, as with an APEC FTA, it would have a negative
impact on the economic welfare and terms of trade of nations outside the agree-
ment—most notably the United States. For Korea, and for other nations, the po-
litical consequences of joining such a bloc could be damaging if their member-
ship produced a backlash from U.S. industry that would translate into protection-
ist intervention by the U.S. Congress. It is, therefore, in the interest of both the
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United States and Korea to work to avoid either a western Pacific or East Asian
FTA that does not include the United States.14
Both Korea and the United States face the immediate problem of the dis-
juncture between the economic logic underlying Asian regional proposals and
political realities. Asian nations today are busily proposing and negotiating small,
bilateral FTAs, largely because they present fewer political problems. This trend,
however, will result in a bad economic outcome and in greater political tensions
and conflicts. Thus, it is in the interest of both the United States and Korea to
think beyond the short-term economic and political attractions of small FTAs and
use their influence to channel the pressures for greater Asian regional arrange-
ments toward large-scale economic agglomerations such as APEC or an inclu-
sive western Pacific–based FTA.
Proposals for Reform of Article 24 of the GATT
The United States and Korea should also unite to clarify and strengthen multilat-
eral rules governing all forms of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements through
amendments to Article 24 of the GATT. Because of the dangers of static and
numerous FTAs, the newly launched Doha Round of WTO negotiations should
be a vehicle for major reform of the rules governing bilateral, subregional, and
regional agreements. Such a reform would be in the interest of both the United
States and Korea, and the two nations could make common cause in pressing for
such reforms. The issue should be of particular importance for Korea now that its
government has announced that it does not intend to exclude agriculture from
future FTAs. Korea, therefore, will want especially to see to it that other Asian
FTAs are held to stricter accountability under new WTO rules.
The GATT in Article 24 has always accommodated bilateral and plurilateral
agreements and also provided rules by which they should be governed. During
the Cold War in the 1950s, however, these rules were violated so that Europe
could build a new economy based on bilateral and regional discrimination against
outside nations. The time has come, however, to rethink and reformulate rules for
FTAs and enforce the sensible rules on the books that have been ignored for four
decades (Barfield 2002).
14. Yang Jun-sok has thoughtfully made the case for Korea’s joining an Asian-based FTA that
does not include the United States. He has noted that Korea and other Asian nations have views
different from the United States on a number of trade issues: antidumping and safeguards
policies, intellectual property, government procurement, investment, the timing of agricultural-
market opening, and labor and environmental standards. He believes that individual countries
of Asia are in a weak bargaining position on these and other issues but that together in a trade
bloc they could negotiate from greater strength with a U.S.-based (presumably FTAA) trade
bloc. Yang also notes, however, that it is not clear that in the near or medium term Asian
countries will be able agree to an FTA, and on some issues—investment, agriculture, and even
antidumping—there may well be divisions that match issues with the United States.
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Current WTO rules provide for two restrictions on FTAs:
• They must operate across the board and not exclude major sectors
of the economy; and
• Tariffs on imports from nations outside the proposed FTA must
not on the whole be higher than they were before the conclusion of the
agreement.
Because of the huge measurement and definitional problem, the second rule
will always be difficult to enforce—particularly now that nontariff barriers in
services and intellectual property need to be incorporated somehow in the trade
restriction formula. The first rule is much more clear-cut, however, and enforce-
ment will be essential given the contemplated structure of a number of Asian
bilateral and subregional agreements.
Initially, both Japan and Korea planned largely to exclude agriculture from
the FTAs they propose. Neither wanted to expose its weak and uncompetitive
agriculture sector to international competition. Recently, however, both Japan
and Korea have announced that they would not exclude this important sector
from their future FTAs proposals. This is good news and should be supplemented
by support for major changes in Article 24. It is in the interest of Korea as well as
Japan to join the United States and other WTO members in clarifying that FTAs
must include all major sectors of the economy.
Several new restrictions should also be considered in order to tie FTAs more
closely to the global free trade goals of the WTO:
• The WTO should prescribe that, for future FTAs, the member na-
tions agree that they will adopt the lowest tariff and the most liberal
trade and investment rule as the baseline for the agreement. This would
mean that in no instance would other WTO members face increased
trade barriers as a result of bilateral, subregional, or regional agree-
ments.
• A new rule should dictate that, after a certain period (somewhere
between five and ten years), the terms of the FTAs would be opened
up on an MFN basis to all members of the WTO.
• Nations entering into FTAs should be obligated to submit to full
surveillance by the new WTO trade policy review mechanism. The
WTO should have the authority to monitor and trace evolving trade
patterns by sector and by industry before and after the agreement is
signed. In this manner, it could assess the amount of trade diversion
and issue rulings dictating changes in the framework of the FTA in
question or compensation for injured parties.
• Article 24 of the GATT should be amended to include a mandate
that all FTAs be open to any other members of the WTO should they
apply. This principle of open regionalism would become an indispens-
able tool in thwarting the creation of preferential trade blocs and in
encouraging what trade economist Richard Baldwin has called the
“domino theory” of regionalism—that is, increasing the pressure for
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countries outside of FTAs to take steps to secure membership in one
or more regional arrangements and thus providing momentum for a
future global free trade arrangement. If these reforms to Article 24 are
put in place, they will go far to ensure that FTAs become building
blocks rather than stumbling blocks for global free trade and competi-
tion.
Current Trade Disputes and Investment Issues between the United
States and Korea
With more than $58 billion in trade flows, Korea and the United States will natu-
rally confront bilateral trade issues and disputes, and government executives and
private-sector corporate officials of the two countries may even exchange acri-
monious comments. Such situations occurred in the past, but no current U.S.-
Korea trade dispute—although they are important and worrying—rises to the
level of crisis. An attempt at detached and unbiased brief descriptions of the
issues raised in key sectors and with regard to key policies that affect trade flows
is followed by recommendations to handle these disputes in a less contentious
manner through public–private partnerships with business, labor, and other civil-
society organizations.
Korea must also deal with the overhang of history, particularly its industrial
policies of the 1970s and 1980s. In a number of instances—automobiles, steel,
and semiconductors are notable examples—the previous overt Korean govern-
ment aid to these sectors colors the current negotiating positions of the United
States and other Korean trading partners. The situation is further complicated by
the short-term negative impact of the 1997 financial crisis, which produced new
temporary government bailouts. Even where evidence of current overt govern-
ment protection or subsidy is weak or unclear, suspicion remains that informal
guidance and government bureaucrats and institutions are still offering help.
Automobiles
While it was subject to a series of government controls designed to prevent ex-
cess competition among domestic producers as well as limit importation from
foreign car manufacturers, the Korean automobile industry throughout the 1980s
and the 1990s recorded major growth. Moving from ninth place among world car
manufacturers in 1991 to fifth place in 1994, Korea exported more than half of its
domestic car production by 1998 (USTR 1998, 270). At the same time, Korea
imported fewer cars than any other major auto-producing country, which caused
a major auto trade imbalance and subsequent trade friction with the rest of the
world.15
15. In 1996, the foreign share in the Korean auto market was less than 1 percent, a proportion
that still holds true. In Japan it is 6 percent; and in France, Germany, and the United States it is
over 25 percent (Manyin 2002).
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Since the early 1990s, the United States has expressed serious concerns with
respect to the limited access of exported U.S. automobiles to the Korean “sanctu-
ary” market. Complaints constantly mentioned:
• High taxes and tariffs;
• Stringent standards and certification procedures;
• Restrictions on advertising and retail financing; and
• Anti-import sentiments and actions.16
Nowadays, the auto trade imbalance between the United States and Korea
continues to disappoint U.S. manufacturers, whose market share in Korea has
remained insignificant.17 Open access to the Korean market still depends on sev-
eral outstanding trade issues that are subject to current negotiations between the
two countries:
• Korea imposes an 8 percent tariff rate on imported cars18 (more
than three times higher than the U.S. tariff), plus multiple taxes levied
on top of that. The U.S. position is that taxes based on engine size
have a disproportionate effect on imported vehicles. Despite isolated
tax reductions,19 tariffs and remaining taxes continue to hinder the
competitiveness of U.S. cars in the Korean market.
• The United States is concerned with a range of standards and clas-
sification issues, including the Korean government’s plans to imple-
ment a pass-by noise standard, apply new taxation standards for sport-
utility vehicles, and change the fuel economy labeling laws and tire
safety inspection rules (USTR 2001).
• U.S. manufacturers complain about the negative sentiment of Ko-
rean consumers toward imported automobiles (Manyin 2002).
16. In December 1996 and early 1997, the Korean National Tax Office engaged in a broad
audit action directed at all leasers of imported autos. Although the action was withdrawn after
complaints by foreign governments, the threat of tax audits for lessees has continued to have a
chilling effect on import sales.
17. With 7,747 automobiles exported to Korea in 2001, U.S. car makers retained a modest 0.7
percent share in Korea. At the same time, Korean exports to the United States soared. With a
record of 470,000 vehicles exported to the United States in 2001, Korean manufacturers at-
tained a 2.7 percent market share (USTR 2002a, 278).
18. U.S.-Korea bilateral consultations led to automobile tariff reductions from 15 percent to 10
percent in 1994, and to 8 percent in 1995 (USTR 1995). The United States has continued to
demand additional tariff cuts, from 8 percent to 2.5 percent.
19. Notable is Korea’s temporary reduction, from November 2001 through June 2002, of the
special consumption tax (USTR 2002a). During bilateral negotiations in August 2002, the
Korean government committed itself to alter tax regulations on cars with an engine size above
2400cc to 10 percent by 2004 (Cooper 2002a, 3). During a December 2002 bilateral meeting,
it was agreed that sport-utility vehicles exported to Korea would not be subject to a special
exercise tax between 7 and 14 percent (Cooper 2002c, 2).
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The Korean government counterclaims that the low market share of imported
automobiles is due to Korean consumers’ decreased purchasing power after the
1997 crisis and their preference for smaller vehicles, the lack of advertising, and
the poor marketing of foreign brands. The Korea Automobile Importers and Deal-
ers Association (KAIDA) underlines the constant increase of foreign car imports
and claims that the market share of imported cars is much higher in value terms
because imported cars are normally upscale models sold to wealthy customers.
However, the absolute number of car imports in Korea remains insignificant when
compared with the domestic sales of Korean automobiles (Table 29).
20. In April 2002, Hyundai Motors began construction in Alabama of an automobile manufac-
turing plant that should produce 300,000 automobiles per year beginning in 2005.
As with U.S.-Japan automobile relations, one key mitigating factor in the
future will be the rise of cross investment in the two countries’ automobile com-
panies and FDI, particularly investment by Korean companies in greenfield plants
in the United States. Thus, the partnership between General Motors and Daewoo,
launched on 15 October 2002 (Cooper 2002b, 3), and the new Hyundai Motors
manufacturing plant in Alabama20 (Starner 2003) represent an effective way to
not only redress the imbalance in the U.S.-Korea bilateral automotive trade but
also trigger meaningful corporate restructuring in Korea’s motor vehicle sector,
allowing U.S. firms to compete successfully in the Korean market.
U.S. negotiators should also face up to certain realities. Over the near term,
U.S. automobile exports to Korea are likely to be squeezed from two sides. Japa-
nese companies that until 1999 were excluded from the Korean market will cer-
tainly move to compete more vigorously in the small-car, low end of the market.
Because the high-end, luxury-car market in Korea up until now has been domi-
nated by German (BMW, Mercedes) and Japanese (Lexus) brands, U.S. automo-
bile companies are not likely to see a large increase in exports to Korea. It would
still make political sense, however, for the Korean government to lower the 8
percent tariff on imported cars. Such a move would remove a major negotiating
point and would likely expose the weakness of U.S. automobile exporters in a
more open, competitive market.
Steel
Neither the United States government nor the Korean government comes to the
table with clean hands regarding public intervention and protection with regard
to the steel industry. The United States has long been concerned with the Korean
government’s involvement in and support for—through extensive ownership and
subsidization—Korea’s steel industry and related steel-using sectors. In turn, Korea
and other U.S. trade partners have long criticized the policies of the U.S. govern-
ment that protect the increasingly uncompetitive integrated steel companies. Cur-
rent U.S.-Korea bilateral trade dialogue focuses on termination of the Korean
government’s ownership in the Korean steel industry, market-based restructuring
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of the Korean steel industry and elimination of government subsidies, and con-
tinued U.S. protection of integrated steel companies through the use—and mis-
use—of trade remedy laws (antidumping and safeguards).
After the consolidations and bankruptcies in Korea during the 1990s, the
1997 depreciation of the won helped large Korean integrated producers, who saw
their export profitability soar due to a decrease of their won-denominated costs
to levels among the lowest worldwide.21 Korea’s steel exports to the United States
more than doubled in 1998 over the previous year (Figure 20). In February 2000,
the United States announced safeguards measures on steel, with the introduction
of high tariff-rate quota restriction with a three-year  duration. However, in Feb-
ruary 2002, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled that the U.S. action was
inconsistent with the Agreement on Safeguards (Manyin 2002).
In March 2002, however, the United States announced additional large-scale
safeguards measures on various steel products, with tariffs ranging from 8 per-
cent to 30 percent for three years (ITR 2002).22 As expected, Korea together with
a group of another seven countries challenged U.S. safeguards measures at the
WTO. In July 2003, a WTO panel ruled that these safeguards were illegal under
WTO rules (ITR 2003b). The Bush administration immediately appealed the rul-
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Source: Manyin 2002, 8.
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21. In contrast, the 1997 financial crisis and related currency depreciation in Korea were
particularly damaging for mini-mill-based firms, many of which went out of business be-
cause of high won-denominated prices for imported ferrous scrap.
22. Canada and Mexico were excepted, and Korea’s POSCO (Pohang Iron and Steel Com-
pany) through its West Coast joint venture was granted an exception for 750,000 metric tons of
hot-band steel.
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ing, and a decision by the WTO appellate body will be forthcoming by the end of
2003 (Meller 2003).
As the sixth-largest exporter to the U.S. steel market in 2001, Korea ex-
ported steel to the United States worth $1,052 million, representing more than
5.7 percent of U.S. steel imports (WTO 2001b, 120). Therefore, Korea is likely
to become one of the economies most affected by the U.S. safeguards because
the U.S. measures cover approximately 70 percent of Korea’s steel exports and
induce a potential 20 percent export reduction effect (McKibbin et al. 2002).
The U.S. safeguards measures supplement the use of antidumping and
countervailing measures as protection instruments for the steel industry. As of
June 2002, the United States maintained effective antidumping measures for 18
product categories imported from Korea; 13 of these involved steel. Most of the
steel measures (8 out of the 13) were imposed after the import surge of 1998.23 As
in the area of safeguards, Korea has won several WTO cases against the United
States. Following the escalation of international trade protectionism and sluggish
economic performance in the United States, Korea’s steel exports to the United
States dropped by more than 30 percent in value terms between the record year
1998 and 2001 (Manyin 2002, 8). Unfortunately for Korea, while winning indi-
vidual cases can give psychological satisfaction, only a wholesale revamping of
national trade remedy laws in the WTO will yield long-term positive economic
consequences.
The United States has long demanded that the Korean government reduce
public ownership and cease subsidies for domestic steel firms. However, it still
maintains control over the Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK), POSCO’s second-
largest single shareholder. With more than 60 percent of the Korean steel industry’s
output in 1999, POSCO’s monopoly position for some key steel products makes
government control even more worrisome (Manyin 2002, 9–10). In fairness to
the Korean government, the POSCO situation is in transition. While it is true that
IBK is POSCO’s second-largest shareholder—the share amounts to only 3 per-
cent—foreign investors now own 60 percent of POSCO. In addition, the govern-
ment has announced plans to fully divest itself of IBK stocks when market condi-
tions improve. Once again, as with steel, history colors current perceptions; as a
tactical move, the new Korean administration would be well advised to divest
itself quickly of IBK stock.
As for the U.S. position, one can only hope—without great optimism, how-
ever, given the strength of the steel lobby in Congress—that the current outburst
of protection will be the last major effort in relation to the steel industry. Eco-
nomics and technology may in the end finally decide the issues. The more ad-
vanced U.S. mini-mills now account for about half of all steel produced in the
23. Antidumping measures concerned stainless steel wire rod, stainless steel plate in coils,
stainless steel sheet and strip in coils, cut-to-length carbon quality steel plate, polyester staple
fiber, structural steel beams, stainless steel angle, and steel concrete reinforcing bars.
Prospects for Future U.S.-Korea Trade and Investment Relations     77
United States, and the number of workers in integrated mills is down to fewer
than 150,000 (from more than 500,000 in the early 1980s). The recent wave of
bankruptcies—and, more important, the liquidations—of a number of integrated
mills may have paved the way for a restructured domestic steel industry, one that
can more effectively compete with new technologies both at home and abroad
(Barfield forthcoming).
Semiconductors
Semiconductors, the largest export and import item for the United States, have
constituted a key trade issue between United States and Korea ever since the
latter half of the 1990s. Korea’s semiconductor exports to the United States
amounted to $2.2 billion in 2000, accounting for more than 5 percent of Korea’s
exports to the United States and for much more than its exports to the United
States of iron and steel ($1.5 billion) (Manyin and Cooney 2003). The United
States has accused Korea of subsidizing and building up the production capacity
of Korean semiconductor manufacturers, government support that has occasion-
ally triggered dramatic falls of the global prices for semiconductors.
In 1998, reacting to the low prices of semiconductors worldwide, Korean
companies reduced their production. Later that year, Korean authorities pursued
a big-deal strategy to restructure Korea’s semiconductor industry; they allowed
Hyundai Electronics (the world’s second-largest manufacturer) to take over LG
Semicon (the world’s third-largest manufacturer), creating the world’s largest
semiconductor manufacturer with a 20 percent global market share. Some ob-
servers were surprised that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission objected to nei-
ther the production cut nor the takeover. Industry analysts recognized that a big-
deal approach would increase chip prices by reducing competition and, thus,
eliminate U.S. discontent with the price drops associated with excessive compe-
tition and overcapacity in the chip industry (Yang 2000, 123–4; Graham 2000).
In 2001, a major trade dispute erupted between the United States and Korea;
it was related to Korea’s support packages for Hynix, the semiconductor division
of Hyundai Electronics. In January 2001, the state-owned Korea Development
Bank (KDB) included Hynix in a bond-refinancing program, under which credi-
tor banks rolled over 80 percent of the company’s debt of 1.625 trillion won
($1.35 billion), repackaged it, and resold it to the public with government guar-
antees. In May 2001, 17 of Hynix’s Korean creditor banks bought 1 trillion won
($833 million) in Hynix bonds. More than 5 trillion won ($4.2 billion) was at-
tached to a new financial package from bank creditors in October 2001, includ-
ing debt-for-equity swaps, further debt rollovers, new loans, and loan write-offs.
The support culminated in December 2002 when Hynix was granted relief for
$4.2 billion in debt, including debt rollovers, loans from state-owned creditors,
decreased interest rates, debt-for-equity swaps, and preferential loans for Hynix’s
key accounts (Manyin and Cooney 2003).
Critics of the debt relief for Hynix assert that government-controlled banks
orchestrated the assistance packages as government-sponsored bailouts that kept
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Hynix afloat and allowed it to export semiconductors at below-market prices. In
response, Korea argues that decisions to aid Hynix have been entirely in the hand
of the company’s creditors, guided by commercial considerations. Many state-
owned banks accepted losses of 75 percent through debt write-offs rather than
increase their exposure to Hynix. The Korean government also argues that for-
eign banks (Citibank and Commerzbank) that oversee credit decisions of Hynix’s
main creditor (Korea Exchange Bank) supported the rescue packages (Manyin
and Cooney 2003).
In November 2002, Micron initiated a countervailing-duty case against Hynix
and Samsung, stating that the Korean government’s subsidies allowed Korean
companies to cut prices and take market share in the United States from both
Micron and Infineon (a German company). In June 2003, the U.S. Department of
Commerce ruled that Hynix had received unfair subsidies and, pending a deci-
sion by the USITC that subsidies were harming U.S. companies, Hynix became
subject to countervailing duties of 44.7 percent (the EU also had imposed
countervailing duties of 33 percent several months before). In turn, the Korean
government announced that it would contest the decision before the WTO (ITR
2003a).
Pharmaceuticals
With $4.9 billion in sales in 1999, Korea ranked 12th among the largest pharma-
ceutical markets worldwide. Imports of pharmaceuticals by Korea accounted for
20 percent of the domestic market. U.S.-Korea trade disputes about pharmaceu-
ticals concern market access for U.S. imports, which have been hindered by a
series of factors:
• Lack of transparency in the Korean Ministry of Health and Wel-
fare (MOHW);
• Discriminatory nature of Korea’s safety and testing requirements
for foreign drugs;
• Poor protection for intellectual property rights (IPR) for medical
patents; and
• New reimbursement policy proposals for prescription drugs.
The United States takes issue with Korea’s policy on pharmaceuticals in
several ways:
• Several U.S.-Korea agreements exist to provide a framework for
dialogue, transparency, and prenotification between the two countries
with respect to health care changes and reform issues intended by the
Korean government.24 However, the United States complains that Ko-
rea has often failed to provide the U.S. government with advance no-
tice of proposals for reforms and changes (USTR 2002a).
24. The agreement on pharmaceutical pricing issues was concluded in 1999, and the bilateral
health care reform working group was established in January 2002.
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• Following the introduction of health care reforms and cost-con-
tainment measures from 1999 to 2001, new issues arose that concerned
safety and testing requirements for foreign drugs in Korea. They in-
clude batch testing of biologics and vaccines for product registration;
border testing for already approved biologics, vaccines, and drugs;
requirements for duplication in Korea of clinical trials already com-
pleted outside Korea, ostensibly because of ethnic sensitivity; and au-
thorization for local clinical studies.
• Lax intellectual property protection, limited concern for business
confidentiality, and inadequate security for data continue to pose mar-
ket access barriers for foreign drug manufacturers in Korea (USTR
2002a).
• The United States is particularly concerned with the proposed
implementation of a reference price system that transfers some of the
pharmaceutical costs from the insurer to the patient (USTR 2002a).
Under the reference price system, if a patient chooses to use a medica-
tion that exceeds a certain price ratio, the patient would assume partial
monetary responsibility for that selection. Korea argues the measure
is necessary to overcome the current crisis of Korea’s National Health
Insurance Scheme (NHIS), which recorded a $2 billion deficit at the
end of 2002 (Embassy 2003). Conversely, the United States believes
that the reference price system would not only deprive Korean con-
sumers of appropriate drugs based on safety, efficacy, and quality but
also discriminate against foreign drug manufacturers, particularly
against the providers of new, research-intensive drugs. Furthermore,
Korea is also considering changes to the A-7 pricing system,25 changes
that are particularly worrisome for the U.S. government (USTR 2002a,
279–80).
Intellectual Property Rights
During the 1990s, Korea was a constant member of the Special 301 priority watch
list, partly because of intellectual property–related concerns. Despite significant
steps to strengthen its IPR enforcement and legislation, reforms still need to pre-
vent production and sale of pirated products into Korea’s domestic market, ex-
portation of products pirated in Korea, and importation of products pirated in
third countries (USTR 2002a; USTR 2002b).
Although Korea has progressed on strengthening its intellectual property
legislation, especially the Copyright Act and the Computer Program Protection
25. In 1999, Korea agreed to price new, innovative drugs at the average ex-factory price of A-
7 countries (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, UK, United States).
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Act, the United States believes that additional changes are still needed.26 Trade-
secret protection remains particularly deficient, with government regulations
requiring submission of very detailed product information as part of certification
procedures. In turn, cases have been recorded when government bodies made confi-
dential business information available to Korean competitors (USTR 2002a, 269).
With regard to pharmaceuticals, Korea is committed to provide full protec-
tion against unfair commercial use of test data submitted for marketing approval.
However, remaining problems are mostly due to the lack of coordination between
Korean health authorities and IPR authorities on marketing approvals for drugs.
Situations occurred when this lack of coordination resulted in granting of marketing
approval for products that may infringe existing patents (USTR 2002a, 269).
On the positive side, in July 2002, the Korean Trade Commission issued the
first ruling on parallel importation; it ordered two unauthorized domestic dis-
tributors of popular U.S. computer games to stop importation and ruled in favor
of a third distributor that has a trademark for similar products sold in Korea (Lim
2002). The ruling provided a set of guidelines regulating parallel importation,
which had never been specifically banned or restricted in Korea.
Agriculture
Korea represents the fourth-largest export market for U.S. agricultural products,
and 44 percent of Korea’s farm imports in 2000 came from the United States
(Manyin 2002, 12). Korea has long resisted opening up its markets for agricul-
ture, particularly for rice and beef, and U.S. producers have long complained
about Korea’s tariff and nontariff barriers in agriculture.
Under the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Agriculture, Korea bound tariffs
for agricultural products, set its tariff rate for rice at 5 percent, committed itself to
lower duties on more than 30 agricultural products of primary interest to U.S.
exporters, and established tariff-rate quotas intended to provide minimum access
on markets previously closed. However, some duties remain very high,27 and
over-quota tariffs are prohibitive for a number of agricultural products28 (USTR
2002a, 255–6). In addition, some requirements related to standards, testing, la-
26. Amendments to the Copyright Act should strengthen technical protection measures, clarify
the establishment of liability for online service providers, clarify the availability of injunctive
ex parte relief in civil enforcement actions, and include provision of exclusive transmission
rights for sound recordings and provision of the full 50 years of protection for preexisting
sound recordings (USTR 2002a, 268).
27. Korea imposes tariff rates of above 40 percent for several products of interest for U.S.
exporters: beef, shelled walnuts, table grapes, canned peaches and fruit cocktail, distilled spir-
its, apples, pears, and citrus fruits.
28. Natural and artificial honey, skim and whole milk powder, barley, barley malt, potatoes and
potato preparations, and popcorn.
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beling, and certification continue to pose excessive market barriers for U.S. ex-
porters of agricultural goods.
The beef quota agreed in 1989 under GATT was completely eliminated in
2001, but beef tariffs currently remain at 42 percent. Korea also failed to provide
the committed minimum market access for imported beef in 1997, 1998, and
1999. Furthermore, U.S. beef exporters faced impediments to entry and distribu-
tion because of Korea’s restrictive domestic regulation and excessive support for
domestic farmers. In July 2000, a WTO panel concluded that Korea’s import
regime discriminates against imports from the United States and other foreign
suppliers owing to the requirement that foreign beef be sold in separate retail
stores and the imposition of other restrictions. In September 2001, Korea com-
plied with the WTO panel findings, putting an end to one of the most contentious
U.S.-Korea trade issues in recent years (USTR 2002a, 258–9).
The Korean government exercises full control over the purchase, distribu-
tion, and end use of rice, and imported rice is allowed only for industrial or pro-
cessing purposes. Importation was long limited to low-quality rice,29 which is
relegated to storage facilities in Korea. Most important, rice importation is sub-
ject to quantitative restrictions unlikely to be dismantled before 2004 (USTR
2002a, 259). Korea has repeatedly stated that it would not allow imported rice to
be distributed directly to consumers; this has generated strong protests from in-
ternational trade partners, including the United States.
Current disagreements also concern Korea’s labeling and rule-of-origin re-
quirements for genetically modified foods, quarantine policies, import certifica-
tion requirements, and test standards, all of which U.S. exporters perceive as
import barriers.
Clearly, Korea—like Japan and the EU—maintains one of the world’s most
restricted markets for agricultural products through a variety of tariffs, quotas,
and other administrative means. As the United States itself has proclaimed in
other bilateral and regional trading negotiations, however, many of these issues
do not lend themselves to bilateral solutions but must be a part of overall multi-
lateral settlement in the Doha Round. Further, the United States has undercut its
own leadership in regard to agricultural trade liberalization by enacting a new
farm support bill that increases internal support subsidies as well as export subsi-
dies. Somewhat in mitigation, however, the United States has advanced (in good
faith because the U.S. agricultural sectors, by and large, have endorsed the pro-
posals) a sweeping set of liberalizing changes that will set the parameters of
reform in the Doha Round. Thus, in the end, while it is understandable that Korea
would resist major reforms ahead of the Doha negotiations, the new Korean ad-
ministration will be well advised to begin to prepare domestic political and agri-
cultural interests for significant changes down the road.
29. In 2001, Korean state trading enterprises for the first time purchased high-quality rice from
the United States.
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Telecommunications
The United States complains about problems encountered in the Korean tele-
communications sector and requests that:
• Licensing not discriminate against services suppliers and equip-
ment makers on the basis of nationality or choice of technology;
• Foreign suppliers of telecommunications equipment and software
be treated fairly in areas including procurement, certification, type of
approval, protection of IPR, and technology transfer; and
• Restrictions on foreign investment in the Korean telecommunica-
tions sector be totally lifted.
Although Korea has committed itself to grant foreign firms national treat-
ment consistent with its WTO obligations, the United States believes that exces-
sive Korean government influence over private operators’ selection of technolo-
gies and interference in private-sector negotiations involving foreign licensing
and technology transfers are detrimental to the quality of services U.S. suppliers
of telecommunication services and equipment can provide to Korean clients. The
limited market access for suppliers of U.S. equipment and software will continue
as a hot topic during U.S.-Korea trade negotiations. Although Korea agreed in
2001 to raise the ceiling for foreign equity ownership in telecommunications
from 33 percent to 49 percent, this did not apply to foreign investment in local
system operators and program providers. In broadcasting, retransmission of for-
eign channels is restricted to 10 percent of the total of all cable and satellite-
broadcasting channels, and FDI in local systems operations and program provid-
ers is limited at 33 percent (USTR 2002a, 271, 282–3).
The United States also has a long history of investment restrictions in the
area of television and telecommunications. Both countries would be well advised
to abolish these restrictions and admit that earlier arguments related to national
security questions are no longer valid or can be handled through other means
without compromising defense requirements.
Financial Services
Since the 1997 financial crisis, Korea’s financial services sector has undergone
major structural reforms that aim “at increasing transparency and investor confi-
dence, and generally purging the sector of moral hazard, that is, the assumption
that government would make good all losses and not permit large companies to
fail” (O’Driscoll et al. 2002, 262).
With $47.9 billion in premiums paid in the 2001 fiscal year, Korea is the
second-largest insurance market in Asia, after Japan, and is the sixth largest in the
world. Market access for foreign insurance companies in Korea, including na-
tional treatment previsions, has been greatly improved since Korea’s accession
to the WTO in 1996 and to the WTO’s Financial Services Agreement in 1997.
Following Korea’s 1997 financial crisis, nationalization and recapitalization
measures worked to strengthen the unstable banking sector and prepare it for
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privatization. In 1998 and 1999, the Korean government opened capital markets
to foreigners, allowing nonhostile M&As of domestic financial institutions. In
April 1999, Korea introduced import-export-related liberalization of foreign ex-
change and, in January 2001, introduced the capital transaction permission sys-
tem. Korea subsequently removed the limits on foreign ownership of listed bonds
and commercial papers, lifted restrictions on foreign securities traded in local
markets, and removed almost entirely the limits on foreign investment in Korean
stocks (USTR 2001, 291). In January 2002, following pressure from the IMF and
the U.S. government, the Korean government announced a consistent plan to
privatize major state-owned banks.
U.S. financial companies still complain about a nontransparent regulatory
system and unduly complicated approval requirements for the introduction of
new products and services in this area where they possess a clear competitive
advantage. Although foreign banks are free to open subsidiaries and direct
branches, Korea still restricts operations of foreign-bank branches on the basis of
branch capital requirements. Such restrictions limit loans to individual customers
as well as foreign exchange operations and transfers, and they impose capital
adequacy and liquidity requirements.
For their part, Korean financial services firms correctly point to the com-
plexities inherent in the U.S. federal system of banking and insurance regulation.
In some cases, regulations of U.S. states still discriminate in significant ways
against foreign companies. More often, the difficulties stem not from overt pro-
tection but merely from the complexity of the myriad state and local regulations
that impede foreign (including Korean) financial services providers from com-
peting effectively in these state and local markets. As with the changes pressed by
the United States regarding Korean financial services laws and regulations, these
issues are long range in nature and should not be the subject of precipitous retal-
iatory trade actions from either side.
Proposal for Dealing More Effectively with Bilateral U.S.-Korea
Trade Disputes
With more than $58 billion in total trade between the United States and Korea, it
is inevitable that U.S. government and private-sector officials and the Korean
government and private-sector officials will find that, even with the best of inten-
tions, numerous trade disputes and conflicts will take more and more of their
time. It is timely, therefore, to think creatively about methods and institutional
arrangements to minimize and even head off at least some of these tensions and
disputes.
U.S. and Korean officials might look to the model for bilateral economic
relations that has had some success in easing tensions and fostering closer eco-
nomic ties between the United States and Europe—the new arrangements created
to carry out the New Transatlantic Agenda agreed to by the United States and the
EU in 1995. That agenda included goals relating to fostering peace, develop-
ment, and democracy; but it is largely devoted to contributing to the expansion of
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trade and closer economic relations as well as building bridges across the Atlan-
tic Ocean through contacts among business, labor, consumer groups, science or-
ganizations, and other civil-society groups (Pollack and Shaffer 2001).
Even though the New Transatlantic Agenda has not realized its highest ini-
tial aspirations regarding the settlement of some of the most difficult transatlantic
trade issues, it has resulted in the creation of new institutions such as the Transat-
lantic Business Dialogue (TBD), the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue, and the Trans-
atlantic Consumer Dialogue that have brought together government officials, pri-
vate-sector leaders, consumer advocates, and leaders of other civil-society orga-
nizations to discuss common problems and recommend actions to top public of-
ficials. The groups meet twice a year and provide a continuing institutional basis
for public–private interaction on common problems—and a venue through which
disagreements can be vetted (Pollack and Shaffer 2001).
The most successful of these institutions thus far has been the TBD, which
has been out front in pressing the United States and Europe for decisions on a
number of issues. It has taken the lead, for example, in pushing for a series of
mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) in areas such as pharmaceuticals, tele-
communications equipment, and medical devices. The aim of these MRAs is to
harmonize regulatory requirements or at least provide criteria for accepting sepa-
rate-but-equal regulations. TBD participants have also been active in pressing
their respective governments to mute potentially corrosive trade quarrels such as
those related to the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and genetically modified organisms
(GMOs). The TBD is not always successful—as the fight over GMOs between
the United States and Europe clearly demonstrates—but the TBD process pro-
vides “thicker” transatlantic exchanges that have fostered a better negotiating
climate.
The Korean and the U.S. governments should consider replicating and insti-
tutionalizing these public–private arrangements to deal with economic issues that
face the two countries. It is true that the U.S.-Korea Chamber of Commerce and
the U.S.-Korea Business Council have performed admirably, but they and other
organizations would benefit from a more formal, institutional setting that brings
together on a regular basis government officials and the business communities.
Other public–private dialogues with labor, environmentalists, and consumer groups
should also be considered.
While the U.S-Korea trade and investment relationship is not as mature as
that between the United States and Europe, it has developed to the point that new,
more imaginative institutional and substantive roles for a variety of actors in the
policy process should at least be placed on the bilateral trade agenda.
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